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Is THE FAILURE To RESPOND APPROPRIATELY To A
NATURAL DISASTER A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY?
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF CYCLONE NARGIS
STUART FORD

On May 2 and 3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, devastating large
portions of the Irrawaddy Delta and creating the potential for a massive
humanitarian crisis. Yet, the Myanmar government rejected aid from some
countries, limited the amount of aid entering the country to afraction of what was
needed, and strictly controlled how that aid was distributed The United Nations
and many governments criticized Myanmar's response to the Cyclone as
inadequate and inhumane, and senior politicians from a number of countries
discussed whether the situationjustified invoking the "responsibility to protect"
doctrine
This article explores several questions, including: (1) whether an inadequate
response to a naturaldisaster can constitute a crime againsthumanity and thus act
as the triggerfor the responsibility to protect; (2) whether the responsibility to
protect could have been invoked by the internationalcommunity in response to
Cyclone Nargis; and (3) what countries would have been obligated to do if it had
been invoked
In particular, assuming that the invocation of the responsibility to protect
would have been based on a finding by the Security Council that crimes against
humanity were being committed by the government of Myanmar, would the
internationalcommunity be obligated to investigate and potentiallyprosecute the
underlying violations of internationalcriminallaw? If so, what venues exist for the
investigation andprosecution of these potentialcrimes?
I. INTRODUCTION

Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May 2 and 3, 2008.1 It wreaked havoc in
the capital, Yangon, devastated large portions of the Irrawaddy Delta, and resulted
in the immediate deaths of tens of thousands of people. 2 Most of the initial deaths
- Stuart

Ford, J.D., LLM, is an Assistant Professor at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago;
previously he was an Assistant Prosecutor at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
He has written about crimes against humanity, genocide, collective security and the use of force in
international relations.
1. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, POST-NARGIS JOINT ASSESSMENT 1 (2008), available at

http://www.aseansec.org/21765.pdf
2. The initial estimates of the death toll were very low, but quickly increased as the scope of the
devastation became apparent. See Tropical Cyclone Kills More Than 350 in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2008, at A10; Seth Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll Hits Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, May
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were caused by the storm surge, which sent a twelve-foot-high wave sweeping
across parts of the Irrawaddy Delta and submerging many villages. The storm
surge destroyed housing, 4 polluted water sources, 5 and contaminated or destroyed
food stocks.6 Many areas remained underwater for days or weeks after the
cyclone. The widespread devastation caused by the cyclone created the potential
for a massive secondary humanitarian crisis.8 Moreover, the geography of the
Irrawaddy Delta made the delivery of humanitarian aid very difficult.

6, 2008, at Al (noting that the initial death toll was reported by state-owned television as 3,934, at the
same time that some government media was indicating it could be 10,000 and the Thai Foreign Minister
indicated it could be 15,000 after meeting with Myanmar's ambassador). By May 7, 2008, the
government was estimating the death toll at 22,500 with an additional 41,000 people missing. See Seth
Mydans & Helene Cooper, Aid for Myanmar Mobilizes, Mixed with Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2008, at Al. By May 14, 2008, the official government toll was 34,273 and the United Nations
estimated that as many as 60,000 had died. See Myanmar Government Still Blocking Large-Scale
Relief Death Toll Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A13.
Eventually, the Myanmar government estimated that at least 134,000 people either died or disappeared
as a result of the cyclone. See Eric Schmitt, Gates Accuses Myanmar of 'Criminal Neglect' Over Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008, at A5; Seth Mydans, Myanmar Rulers Still Impede Access, Relief Groups
Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A8. See also THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra note 2, at 1.
According to a joint report of the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the government of Myanmar, more than 800,000 people were displaced by the storm and more than
2.4 million people were "severely affected" by it. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra note 1, at 1.
The report noted that there was "near-total destruction" of fields and housing in areas that were directly
hit by the cyclone. Id.
3. See Mydans & Cooper, supranote 2.
4. An initial assessment by the World Food Program estimated that 1,000,000 people had been
left homeless. See Mydans & Cooper,supra note 2. A joint report by the United Nations, ASEAN and
the Myanmar government concluded that 450,000 houses were destroyed and found that 57% of the
households in affected areas reported their housing totally destroyed, with another 25% reporting their
houses partially destroyed. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supranote 1, at 13-14.
5. "The storm has mixed drinking water and sewage, posing a severe risk of diarrheal diseases,
and flooding has left vast pools of standing water where mosquitoes can breed and spread malaria and
dengue fever." Andy Newman, U.N. PressuringMyanmar to End Barriersto Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2008, at Al. Prior to the cyclone, many people relied on rainwater collection systems and local ponds
for water. More than 40% of these ponds were damaged by the cyclone and the rainwater collection
systems were often destroyed along with people's housing. As a result, more than 60% of people in the
affected areas had inadequate access to clean drinking water. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra
note 1, at 15-16. In addition, the combination of unsanitary defecation practices and the increased
reliance on drinking river water after the destruction of ponds created a significant health risk. Id. at 17.
6. See TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra note 1, at 6-7 (noting that more than half of the
households living in the most affected areas reported having lost all of their food stocks during the
cyclone). See also In FloodedDelta, a Want as Pervasive as Death,N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at Al
(noting that villagers were eating waterlogged bananas and rotting fruit because there were no other
alternatives); Weeks After Cyclone in Myanmar, Even Farmers Wait for Food, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2008, at Al (noting that the storm destroyed rice stocks and ruined rice fields).
7. On 8 May 2008, whole villages in the delta remained underwater. See Seth Mydans,
Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/world/asia/08myanmar.html.
According to the regional director
of UNICEF, a large number of villages remained inundated in early June. See Mydans, Myanmar
Rulers Still Impede Access, Relief Groups Say, supra note 2.
8. It was obvious immediately after the cyclone struck Myanmar that it had created the
possibility for a secondary crisis. International media reports quickly noted the lack of drinking water,
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It quickly became apparent that unless a major aid effort was undertaken, tens
of thousands more people could die from disease and starvation.10 Yet, it appeared
that the government was both ill-equipped to respond to the crisis" and reluctant to
expend the effort necessary to organize an effective response. 12 Initially, the junta
seemed more interested in preparations for a May 10 referendum on a new
constitution.13 There were also allegations that the government had been aware

food, power, and the widespread destruction of homes. See Tropical Cyclone Kills More than 350 in
Myanmar, supra note 2, at A10 (quoting the UN relief coordinator as saying "'[t]he Irrawaddy Delta
was hit extremely hard, not only because of the wind and rain, but because of the storm surge .... The
villages there have reportedly been completely flattened."'); Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll
Hits Thousands, supra note 2. There were also fears of an epidemic caused by the many thousands of
dead bodies that were left in the wake of the cyclone. See Mydans, Myanmar FacesPressure to Allow
Major Aid Effort, supranote 7.
9. See Thomas Fuller, Region Poses Challengefor Aid Delivery, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at
A14 ("The area worst affected by the cyclone that struck Myanmar on Saturday is a vast and populous
delta crisscrossed by canals and inlets, qualities that are likely to make the damage extensive and
delivering aid extraordinarily difficult."); Schmitt, supra note 2 (quoting U.S. Defense Secretary Robert
Gates as saying that helicopters were the only way to get assistance to many parts of the Irrawaddy
Delta that had been cut off by the storm).
10. See Mydans & Cooper, supra note 2 (quoting the U.S. head of UNICEF as saying "Our
biggest fear is that the aftermath could be more lethal than the storm itself."); Newman, supra note 6
("Aid officials and health experts warned that the slow response could lead to outbreaks of diseases like
cholera and malaria, adding substantially to the death toll. And a prolonged delay could spread
malnutrition and starvation across the vast area affected."); Warren Hoge & Seth Mydans, U.N. Leader
Tells Mlyanmar's Regime There's 'No More Time to Lose', N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at A6 (quoting
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, who said "'We are at a critical point .... Unless more aid gets
into the country very quickly, we face an outbreak of infectious diseases that could dwarf today's
crisis."'); Helene Cooper & Thom Shanker, U.S. Frustratedby Myanmar MilitaryJunta's Limits on Aid
in Wake of Cyclone, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2008, at A5; Seth Mydans, Donors Press Myanmar to Let
Aid Workers In, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at A6.
11. Groups outside Myanmar were quick to point out that the military junta was ill-prepared to
respond effectively to the crisis and would need international assistance. See Tropical Cyclone Kills
More Than 350 in Myanmar, supra note 2. See also Newman, supranote 6 (noting that Myanmar was
ill equipped to respond to a public health crisis and that the country's public health infrastructure was
crumbling); Myanmar Government Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra
note 2 (noting concerns by the British ambassador to the United Nations that Myanmar government did
not have the capacity to distribute aid to the more than 1.5 million people in need).
12. Residents of Yangon complained shortly after the cyclone struck that the military was doing
little to help victims of the storm. See TropicalCyclone Kills More Than 350 in Myanmar, supranote 2
("Some in Yangon, formerly Rangoon, complained that the 400,000-member military was doing little to
help victims after the storm ....
); Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll Hits Thousands, supra
note 2 (noting that some Burmese were complaining that the military had been slow to respond to the
emergency). By May 8, 2008, the Myanmar government had committed to using 7 helicopters and 80
ships for relief work, a number described by the World Food Program as "a very small number
considering the enormous logistical needs." See Mydans, supra note 7.
13. See Tropical Cyclone Kills More Than 350 in Myanmar, supra note 2 (noting that the
government intended to go forward with the referendum despite the cyclone); Newman, supra note 5
(noting that the government had decided to postpone the referendum in parts of the Irrawaddy Delta
affected by the cyclone but would continue with it in the rest of the country); Seth Mydans, Myanmar
Seizes U.N. Foodfor Cyclone Victims and Blocks ForeignExperts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at A1O
("The junta's plan to go ahead with the vote while restricting aid deliveries drew widespread criticism
and concern that soldiers who could be rescuing survivors were likely to be sent to polling places
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that the cyclone would strike Myanmar and could cause considerable loss of life
but had refused to warn the population in advance. 14
The international community rushed to provide substantial humanitarian aid
to the government of Myanmar." However, the military junta rejected some of the
aid offered by countries it viewed as hostile, including aid offered by the United
States, France, and Great Britain. 16 It also strictly controlled how much aid was
admitted 17 and how that aid was distributed. " The government particularly
objected to the admission of international experts to assist in assessing the crisis
and distributing the aid. Many aid workers were simply denied visas to enter the

instead.").
14. See Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll Hits Thousands, supra note 2 (noting that both
citizens of Yangon and U.S. First Lady Laura Bush complained that the Myanmar government failed to
warn people in advance so that they could prepare).
15. By 7 May 2007, the international community and aid organizations were already mobilizing
for a major relief operation and some international aid was already beginning to reach Myanmar. See
Mydans & Cooper,supra note 2. By 26 May 2008, donors had pledged more than $150 million in aid.
See Mydans, supranote 10.
16. The United States offered to use Navy warships and aircraft to deliver aid and locate the
missing but this was rejected. See Mydans & Cooper, supra note 2. By 8 May 2008, French, British,
and Indian naval vessels were in position to provide aid, but this too was rejected. See Mydans,
Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supra note 7; Newman, supra note 5; Seth
Mydans, U.N. Leader Aims to Get More Aid in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2008, at A14. On 8
May 2008, a Thai-brokered deal to allow an American C-130 to deliver aid fell apart, apparently over
suspicion of the United States' motives. See Newman, supra note 5. By 13 May 2008, the U.S. had a
dozen transport helicopters in position to assist, with another dozen set to arrive in 24 hours. Hoge &
Mydans, supra note 10. The government eventually allowed some U.S. planes carrying relief supplies
to land but refused U.S. offers to send search and rescue teams and disaster relief experts. Myanmar
Government Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2. The Myanmar
government also apparently rejected offers of search and rescue teams from a number of other
countries. Id.
17. See Mydans, Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supranote 7 ("As hungry,
shivering survivors waited among the dead for help after a huge cyclone in Myanmar, aid agencies and
diplomats said Wednesday that the delivery of relief supplies was being slowed by the reluctance of the
country's secretive military leaders to allow an influx of outsiders."). Id. ("[T]he Myanmar government
has let in little aid and has restricted movement in the delta, aid agencies say. It has not granted visas to
aid workers, even though supplies are being marshaled in nearby countries like Thailand."). See also
Myanmar Government Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2 ("Ten
days after the devastating cyclone struck, the isolationist military government has slightly eased its
restrictions on aid but is still blocking most large-scale deliveries of relief supplies, aid officials said.").
18. On 8 May 2008, the World Food Program reported that a shipment of high energy biscuits had
been delayed for a day because the Myanmar government had initially insisted that it control the
distribution of the aid. See Mydans, Myanmar FacesPressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supranote 7.
See also Aid Groups Say Some Myanmar FoodAid is Stolen or Diverted by the Military, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2008, at A12 ("The fate of the [relief] supplies after [they arrived in Myanmar], however,
remained unknown, because the junta has barred all foreigners, including credentialed diplomats and
aid workers, from accompanying any donated aid, tracking its distribution or following up on its
delivery."); Cooper & Shanker, supra note 10 (noting that four of the six plane-loads of supplies that
arrived on 16 May 2008 went to the Myanmar military and only two went directly to nongovernmental
organizations for distribution); Mydans, supra note 10 ("Until now, the military has mostly insisted that
all aid go through its hands and has even confiscated supplies from residents who tried to distribute

it.").
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country. 19 Moreover, for the first three weeks, all foreigners, including those aid
workers that had been admitted to the country, were prohibited from entering the
Irrawaddy Delta. 20 At one point, the government seized all of the food, aid, and
equipment brought into the country by the World Food Program. 21 The regime
also tried to control aid efforts by private individuals and domestic organizations,22
and there were allegations that the junta was diverting aid from those in need to its
own supporters.23

19. As early as 7 May 2008, United Nations disaster assessment officials were waiting for visas to
enter Myanmar and the government was refusing to allow entry to a team from the United States
Agency for International Development. See Mydans & Cooper, supra note 2. By 8 May 2008 there
were between 50 and 100 United Nations aid workers waiting for visas to enter the country. See
Mydans, Myanmar FacesPressure to Allow MajorAid Effort, supranote 7. See Newman, supranote 5
("Since the cyclone hit, aid officials said, Myanmar's military rulers have granted visas for aid workers
only grudgingly and have placed restrictions on supplies coming into the country . . . ."). Id. ("The
Myanmar government said Friday that it was willing to receive relief supplies but not foreign relief
workers and that it had turned back an aircraft that arrived Thursday carrying a search-and-rescue team.
. . ."). See When Burmese Offer a Hand, Rulers Slap It, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2008, at Al (noting that
many aid agencies were still waiting for visas for their staff). By 14 May 2008, the United Nations had
received visas for less than half of the more than 100 staff who had applied. See Myanmar Government
Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2. On 15 May 2008, the military
junta re-iterated its position that it was in control of relief operations and did not need foreign experts to
Thailand's prime minister. Aid Groups Say Some Myanmar Food Aid Is Stolen or Diverted by the
Military, supra note 18.
20. See InternationalPressure on Myanmar JuntaIs Building, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A8;
Seth Mydans, U.N. Chief Says Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/24/world/asia/24myanmar.html? r-l&scp=1&sq=U.N.%20Chieo2
OSays%20Myanmar/o2OYields%20ono2oAid%2oWorkers&st-cse.
Foreign aid workers were first
allowed into the devastated areas on 27 May 2008. See Seth Mydans, A Few Aid Workers Reach Into
Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2008, at A7.
21. Mydans, supra note 13. At the same time, other aid agencies like UNICEF, the International
Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders reported being able to deliver aid. Id.
22. See When Burmese Offer a Hand, Rulers Slap It, supra note 19; Weeks After Cyclone in
Myanmar, Even Farmers Wait for Food, supra note 6 (noting that the police operated checkpoints,
turned away foreigners without government-approved permits, and warned Burmese who passed
through the checkpoints not to distribute aid).
23. See When Burmese Offer a Hand,Rulers Slap It, supra note 19 (reporting allegations that: (1)
local military officials had received good rice from the United Nations but kept it for themselves and
distributed rotten rice to the cyclone survivors; and (2) that the military had taken relief supplies
donated by other countries and then sold it to those in need for a profit); Myanmar Government Still
Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2 (noting that the United Nations and
the United Kingdom were concerned that aid was being diverted to people who did not need it); Aid
Groups Say Some Myanmar Food Aid Is Stolen or Diverted by the Military, supra note 18 ("The
directors of several relief organizations in Myanmar said Wednesday that some of the international aid
arriving into the country for the victims of Cyclone Nargis was being stolen, diverted or warehoused by
the country's army."). See also Amnesty Int'l, Myanmar Briefing: Human Rights Concerns a Month
After Cyclone Nargis, Al Index ASA 16/013/2008, June 5, 2008, at 7-9, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA16/013/2008/en.
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The United Nations repeatedly criticized the slow pace of the relief effort, 24
amid concerns that large numbers of people who had survived the initial storm
surge were dying because they had not received aid.25 On May 11, the
spokesperson for the World Food Program stated that the government was only
allowing in 10 percent of the needed aid.26 Three weeks after Cyclone Nargis, aid
was still only reaching 25 percent of the 2.4 million victims of the storm. 27 For its
part, the Myanmar government insisted that things were quickly returning to
normal and that it had the situation under control.28 Senior British and U.S.
officials criticized the response of the junta as "inhuman" and "criminal neglect."29
On May 20, 2008, there was a small breakthrough, as the Myanmar
government agreed to allow greater amounts of aid from fellow ASEAN
countries.30 This was followed on May 24, 2008 by a deal brokered by U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to allow aid workers of any nationality to enter

24. The United Nations official in charge of the relief effort said that "'The situation is profoundly
worrying . . . . They have simply not facilitated access in the way we have a right to expect."' See
Newman, supranote 5. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said that the effect of the government's failure
to allow aid could be "truly catastrophic." Mydans, supra note 13. On May 13, 2008, the SecretaryGeneral expressed "deep concern and immense frustration" with the government's "unacceptably slow
response" to the crisis. Hoge & Mydans, supranote 10.
25. See Newman, supra note 5 ("Aid officials and health experts warned that the slow response
could lead to outbreaks of diseases like cholera and malaria, adding substantially to the death toll. And
a prolonged delay could spread malnutrition and starvation across the vast area affected."). Id. ("'It's a
race for time, a race to save lives,' said Henrietta H. Fore, administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development"). See Mydans, supra note 13 ("[T]he refusal of the country's iron-fisted
rulers to allow doctors and disaster relief experts to enter in large numbers contributed to the growing
concern that starvation and epidemic diseases could end up killing people on the same scale as [Cyclone
Nargis]."). See Hoge & Mydans, supra note 10 ("By keeping most foreign assistance out . . . the
generals must be ready to accept the deaths of hundreds of thousands more people, according to foreign
relief officials. At the moment, that is the choice it appears to be making.").
26. See When Burmese Offer a Hand, Rulers Slap It, supra note 19. A few days later, the World
Food Program indicated that it was only being allowed to ship in 20% of the food it needed to distribute
to keep up with the most urgent needs. See Hoge & Mydans, supranote 10.
27. See Mydans, U.N. ChiefSays Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, supranote 20; Mydans, supra
note 10.
28. See Newman, supra note 5. On 24 May 24, 2008, even though only 25% of the victims had
received assistance, the Myanmar government declared that "the emergency phase" of the crisis was
over and that the government would now focus on reconstruction. Mydans, U.N. Chief Says Myanmar
Yields on Aid Workers, supra note 20. The international community generally rejected the contention
that the emergency phase of the crisis was over. See Weeks After Cyclone in Myanmar, Even Farmers
Wait for Food, supra note 6. In response to criticism of its response to the cyclone, the Myanmar
government claimed that it had promptly delivered relief to all of the storm's victims. See Schmitt,
supranote 2.
29. The British Prime Minister described the crisis as a "man-made catastrophe [caused] by the
negligence, the neglect and the inhuman treatment of the Burmese people . . . " by the Myanmar
government. InternationalPressure on Myanmar Junta Is Building, supra note 20. U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates accused the Myanmar government of "criminal neglect" for blocking
international aid, although he ruled out any humanitarian intervention that did not have Security
Council approval. See Schmitt, supra note 2.
30. See Seth Mydans & Alan Cowell, Myanmar to Widen Neighbors'AidRole, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2008, at A10.
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the country.31 A few days later, the government eased some of the restrictions on
foreign aid workers and allowed more aid to flow into the devastated regions.32
Despite the loosening of some restrictions, aid agencies continued to report that the
government was making it difficult to coordinate and deliver aid.33 At the same
time, the government began evicting people from camps and shelters and sending
them back to their home villages, even if their homes no longer existed. 34
Tensions continued between aid workers and the Myanmar government over the
aid effort well into June.
During the crisis, Bernard Kouchner, the French Foreign Minister, famously
recommended that the international community deliver the waiting humanitarian
aid over the objections of the Myanmar government: "We are seeing at the United
Nations if we can't implement the responsibility to protect, given that food, boats
and relief teams are there, and obtain a United Nations resolution which authorizes
the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government."36 Kouchner also
suggested that the ruling junta could be guilty of crimes against humanity for
restricting the supply of aid.37 Several other senior European officials made
similar statements.38 There are also indications that the United States and some
European nations considered requesting a Security Council resolution that would
31. See Mydans, U.N. ChiefSays Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, supranote 20. Announcement
of the deal was met with cautious optimism by aid agencies. Id.
32. See Mydans, A Few Aid Workers Reach Into Myanmar, supra note 20 (noting that the
government was allowing some foreign aid workers to visit areas devastated by the cyclone).
33. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Rulers Still Impede Access, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A8; See also
Myanmar Junta Begins Evicting Cyclone Victims From Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A5
(noting that aid groups were still being required to apply for special travel permits to enter the delta).
34. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 3-6 (noting that Amnesty International had identified
more than 30 instances of the forcible displacement of cyclone survivors but that "anecdotal evidence
from numerous sources strongly suggests a much higher number"); Monks Succeed in Cyclone Reliefas
Junta Falters,N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/3 1/world/asia/
31myanmar.html; see also Mydans, supra note 34; Myanmar Junta Begins Evicting Cyclone Victims
From Shelters,supra note 33.
35. See Burmese Endure in Spite of Junta, Aid Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at Al
(noting that many people were still not receiving adequate aid and that the government had recently
issued a directive effectively requiring all foreign aid workers to be accompanied by government
officials).
36. See Mydans, Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supra note 7. The United
Nations was not particularly supportive of the idea. Id Bernard Kouchner had been a proponent of the
concept of humanitarian intervention, which had preceded the responsibility to protect doctrine. See
Gareth Evans, From HumanitarianIntervention to the Responsibility to Protect,24 WIs. INT'L L.J. 703,
706 (2006).
37. See Mydans & Cowell, supranote 30.
38. At least one French ambassador warned that the Myanmar government's refusal to allow aid
might lead "to a true crime against humanity." InternationalPressure on Myanmar Junta is Building,
supra note 20. Javier Solana, the foreign policy chief for the European Union, echoed Kouchner's
words about invoking the responsibility to protect: "'We have to use all the means to help those people.
. . . The United Nations charter opens some avenues if things cannot be resolved in order to get
humanitarian aid to arrive."' Myanmar Government Still Blocking Relief supra note 2. The British
Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, took the position that the responsibility to protect could apply to the
situation in Myanmar. The UN and HumanitarianIntervention: To Protect Sovereignty, or to Protect
Lives?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2008, at 50.
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authorize the delivery of humanitarian aid without the consent of the Myanmar
government. This plan was apparently dropped when it became clear that China
would veto any such resolution.39
Kouchner's comments led to a vigorous debate about whether the
responsibility to protect 40 could properly be invoked in response to the
humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. 41 Some commentators have suggested that the
responsibility to protect doctrine should have been applied,42 while others have
argued that it would have been inappropriate.
In order to determine if the
39. Cooper & Shankar, supra note 10; Jonathan Marcus, World Wrestles with Burma Aid Issue,
BBC NEWS, May 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7392662.stm. See also Mydans &
Cowell, supranote 30 (noting that Chinese officials had stressed that Myanmar was a sovereign country
and that the admission of aid would depend on the consent of the government).
40. The responsibility to protect doctrine is described in more detail below in Section III. It is a
relatively recent development in international law and posits that states have an obligation to prevent
certain crimes from occurring on their territory. If a state is unable or unwilling to prevent these crimes,
then the international community may intervene to prevent them. Intervention is not mandatory and is
still dependent on the political will of the international community and the acquiescence of permanent
members of the Security Council, but the international community now generally accepts that some
form of intervention is legitimate in response to particularly egregious international crimes.
41. See Ramesh Thakur, Should the UN Invoke the 'Responsibilityto Protect'?,GLOBE AND MAIL
(Canada), May 8, 2008, at A21; Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, Responsibility to Protect? Yes, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Canada), May 9, 2008, at A22; Marcus, supra note 39; Gareth Evans, Facing Up to Our
Responsibilities, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 12, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfre
e/2008/may/ 12/facinguptoourresponsbilities; Fred Hiatt, In Burma, a U.N. Promise Not Kept, WASH.
POST, May 12, 2008, at A19; Lloyd Axworthy, International Community has a Responsibility to
Protect Myanmar, EDMONTON J., May 13, 2008, http://www.canada.com/edmontonjoumal/
news/opinion/story.html?id=6056af9d-43eb-4575-81b3-9235750e3214; Ivo Daalder & Paul Stares, The
UN's Responsibility to Protect, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/05/13/opinion/13iht-edaalder.1.12841976.html; Maggie Farley, The World: How to Help
When Help is Refused?, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at 9; Robert D. Kaplan, Aid at the Point of a Gun,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A23; Editorial, Shame on the Junta, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A22;
The UN and HumanitarianIntervention: To Protect Sovereignty, or to Protect Lives?, supra note 38;
Chris Beyrer & Jared Genser, Op-Ed., Burma's Next Wave of Dying, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/2008/05/21/burmas next wave of
dying/; Tyra R. Saechao & Sujeet B. Rao, Op-Ed., Aid for Myanmar: Strategies for International
Relief WASH. TIMES, May 30, 2008, at A21; David Rieff, HumanitarianVanities, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2008, at MM13; W. Andy Knight & Vasselin Popovski, Putting People Ahead of Protocol,EDMONTON
J., June 4, 2008, http://www.canada.com/edmontonjoumal/news/ideas/story.html?id=0f41843-446d4fce-b650-b3c904487a93; Madeleine K. Albright, The End of Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2008,
at A23.
42. See Evans, supra note 41 (noting that "[i]f what the generals are now doing, in effectively
denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be
characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed kick
in"); Lloyd Axworthy, supra note 41 (arguing that the responsibility to protect does apply to natural
disasters); Daalder & Stares, supranote 41; Shame on the Junta, supranote 41; Beyrer & Genser, supra
note 41; Knight & Popovski, supranote 41.
43. See Thakur, supra note 41; Saechao & Rao, supra note 41. The Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect also produced a report that concluded that "there is no prima facie case for
arguing that the regime's failure to provide full access to humanitarian organizations in the wake of
Cyclone Nargis triggers the Responsibility to Protect principle." ASIA-PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, CYCLONE NARGIS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
MYANMAR/BuRMA BRIEFING No. 2, at 8 (2008), available at http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents
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responsibility to protect doctrine applied to Cyclone Nargis, it first must be
determined whether or not the situation in Myanmar constituted a crime against
humanity. While the situation in Myanmar did not fit easily into the confines of a
traditional crime against humanity, it more closely resembles that than a war crime,
genocide, or ethnic cleansing."
If the situation in Myanmar was a crime against humanity, then the
responsibility to protect would be applicable. First and foremost, this would
impose a burden on Myanmar to take all necessary action to ameliorate the
situation. If Myanmar was unable or unwilling to take the appropriate action, it
would impose a burden on the international community to take steps to protect the
civilian population of Myanmar. While the responsibility to protect doctrine
emphasizes the need to use peaceful means first, it also commits the international
community to taking "timely and decisive" action through the Security Council, if
necessary. 45 This could include a Security Council resolution that permitted the
delivery of humanitarian assistance by international forces on Myanmar's territory,
although coercive military action would generally be considered a last resort.
Thus, the question of whether crimes against humanity were occurring in
Myanmar was crucial to the argument that the responsibility to protect doctrine
could be invoked to override the government's resistance to the delivery of
humanitarian aid. It also gives rise to a second important issue. If crimes against
humanity were being committed, then it raises the possibility that some person or
group of persons could be held individually criminally liable for those crimes.
These are two very different kinds of responsibilities: (1) the obligations of states
(both Myanmar and the international community at large) to the civilian population
of Myanmar, and (2) the possible criminal liability of individuals for crimes
against humanity.
This article will first examine whether the situation in Myanmar could
reasonably have been described as a crime against humanity based on the
/Burma Brief2.pdf.
44. In October 2005, the heads of states present at the World Summit agreed that the responsibility
to protect applied to situations where genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing
were taking place. See infra notes 202-206. The situation in Myanmar was not a war crime because
there was no armed conflict taking place in the Irrawaddy Delta at the time. It was not genocide
because there was no evidence of a specific intent to destroy a particular racial, religious, national or
ethnical group in whole or in part. Nor is there evidence that the dead and dying were targeted because
of their membership in a protected group. Finally, it was not ethnic cleansing because there was no
evidence that the Myanmar government (or anyone else) was using force or intimidation to remove
people of a certain ethnic or religious group from the area affected by the cyclone. While there was
some evidence of forcible displacements by the Myanmar government beginning at the end of May,
those displacements did not seem to be motivated by the ethnicity or religion of the victims. See supra
note 35. Rather, the displacements seemed to be an effort to minimize the apparent scope of the crisis
by forcing people to leave shelters and government-run camps.
45. The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit specifically mentions the possibility of
acting through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which gives the Security Council the power
to take coercive measures to ensure peace and security. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A.
Res. 60/1, 1 139, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document].
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information available to the international community in May 2008. It will examine
various legal theories that are suggested by the facts outlined above and apply the
jurisprudence of the existing international courts46 to determine whether there was
sufficient reason to believe that crimes against humanity were being committed to
justify invoking the responsibility to protect. It will then address the applicability
of the responsibility to protect doctrine and discuss what the international
community could and should have done in response to the Myanmar government's
refusal to admit aid. Finally, assuming there was reason to believe that crimes
against humanity were being committed, it will examine potential venues for any
investigations and trials.
II. WERE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN THE AFTERMATH OF
CYCLONE NARGIS?

Cyclone Nargis or its aftermath could be considered a crime against humanity
if: (1) one or more of the following acts - murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation or forcible transfer of populations, imprisonment, torture, rape and
sexual violence, persecutions, or other inhumane actS4 7 - was committed; (2) in
connection with a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population.48

46. Throughout this article, except where it is specified otherwise, the term international courts
will be used to refer to both fully international courts, including the International Criminal Court, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, and to hybrid international courts like the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
47. These crimes are usually referred to as either: (1) the enumerated crimes because these are the
crimes that are enumerated in the definition of crimes against humanity; or (2) the underlying acts
because these are the acts that underlie a finding that crimes against humanity have been committed.
The terms enumerated crimes and underlying acts will be used interchangeably in this article.
Most definitions of crimes against humanity adopt a fairly similar set of enumerated crimes. See Law
on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 5, NS/RKMI1004/006, Oct. 27,
2004 [hereinafter ECCC Law]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, Annex 1, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; The SecretaryGeneral, Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, Annex 1, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone expands the rape component to also include sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence. Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2(g), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
The Rome Statute also contains slightly broader definitions of a number of these components. For
example, it includes forcible transfers in addition to deportations, presumably to cover situations where
the victims are not forced to cross an international boundary. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 7(d), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. It includes an
expanded prohibition on sexual violence quite similar to art. 2 of the SCSL Statute and also includes a
broader definition of persecution. Id. arts. 7(g)-(h). Finally, the Rome Statute includes two additional
physical acts, apartheid and the enforced disappearance of persons, which are not present in the statutes
of any of the other international tribunals. Id. arts. 7(i)-().
48. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7; SCSL Statute, supra note 47, art. 2; ICTR Statute,
supranote 47, art. 3; ECCC Law, supranote 47, art. 5. ICTY cases have also adopted this requirement.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, T 181 (Nov. 30, 2005). There are some
differences in how the various tribunals have addressed this element, and these differences will be
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Both elements must be present for a crime against humanity to exist. This section
will first address the necessary threshold for invoking the responsibility to protect.
Next, it will examine whether any of the underlying acts necessary for a crime
against humanity were present. Finally, it will address whether or not the cyclone
or its aftermath constituted a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population.49
A. The Thresholdfor Invoking the Responsibility to Protect
This article's determination of whether there was reason to believe that crimes
against humanity were being committed in Myanmar during and shortly after
Cyclone Nargis will be made based on the "facts" described above in Section I.
These facts are taken from contemporaneous newspaper reports and the statements
of various NGOs and United Nations agencies. The author's personal experience
in investigating and prosecuting violations of international criminal lawo suggests
that a formal criminal investigation would conclude that the facts are far more
complex and nuanced than is apparent from the sources cited above. Indeed,
nothing in this article should be interpreted as a finding that crimes against
humanity did, in fact, take place. Such a determination could only be made after a
trial that met all of the procedural safeguards required by international law.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary (or possible) at this juncture to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that crimes against humanity were committed in Myanmar. 1
The responsibility to protect doctrine does not require a conviction for crimes
against humanity before it can be invoked; 52 although it is not clear what level of
addressed below in Section II(C).
49. The enumerated crimes will be addressed first because whether or not there is an attack
depends on whether or not there is evidence of the widespread or systematic commission of crimes
similar to the enumerated crimes. See infra Section II(C)(1). Thus, the existence of the enumerated
crimes has a direct bearing on whether or not there is an attack.
50. The author spent several years working in the Office of the Co-Prosecutors at the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, where he investigated and prosecuted former
leaders of the Khmer Rouge for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.
51. The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard would be necessary to obtain a conviction against a
particular person on particular facts. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 66, para. 3; Internal Rules of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Rev. 4), Rule 87(1), Sep. 11, 2009 [hereinafter
ECCC Internal Rules]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule
87(A), Apr. 12, 2002 [hereinafter SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence]; International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 87(A),
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 43 (July 24, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence];
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 87(A), U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (adopted on June 29, 1995, as amended on March 14, 2008) [hereinafter ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence].
52. To require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the doctrine could be invoked would
essentially neuter it. The whole point of the responsibility to protect doctrine is to allow "timely and
decisive" action in response to humanitarian crises. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra
note 45, 139. The threshold for action cannot be so high that the doctrine cannot be invoked in time to
save lives. See Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": HumanitarianConcern and the
Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 711 (2007).
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evidence is required before the doctrine applies. One way to determine when the
responsibility to protect can be invoked is to look at international criminal
procedure. Since the responsibility to protect doctrine uses the commission of
international crimes as its trigger, it stands to reason that the standards used by
international courts to investigate and prosecute international crimes are relevant.
There are three commonly used thresholds that might be relevant: (1) the threshold
necessary to initiate a criminal investigation, (2) the threshold necessary to arrest a
suspect or place a suspect in pre-trial detention, and (3) the threshold necessary to
confirm an indictment.
All of the international courts use a system of increasing evidentiary
thresholds at each stage of the proceedings. Generally, the threshold necessary to
initiate an investigation is quite low. At the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), the decision to initiate an investigation is entirely at the discretion of the
prosecutor.53 At the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),
the Co-Prosecutors must have a "reason to believe" that crimes within the
jurisdiction of the court have been committed to initiate a judicial investigation,5 4
but the belief is subjective." The other international courts require either a
reasonable or a sufficient basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the
court have been committed.56
There is a higher standard applied to issuing arrest warrants and placing
suspects in pre-trial detention. At the International Criminal Court (ICC), the PreTrial Chamber can issue an arrest warrant and detain a person pending trial when
there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the person has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the court. 7

The SCSL uses a "reason to believe"

standard." The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will place a suspect in
provisional detention if there is a "reliable and consistent body of material which
tends to show" that the suspect committed a crime within the court's jurisdiction.59

53. The SCSL imposes no threshold on the initiation of an investigation. The Prosecutor is
responsible for the investigations and acts independently in fulfilling that responsibility. SCSL Statute,
supra note 47, art. 15(1). Consequently, the decision whether to open an investigation is apparently
entirely within the discretion of the Prosecutor. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A,
Judgment,
280-84 (Feb. 22, 2008) (holding that the Prosecutor had unfettered discretion to determine
who to investigate and charge).
54. ECCC Internal Rules, supranote 51, Rule 53(1).
55. The Co-Prosecutors can "decide, at their discretion," whether to accept or reject complaints.
Id. Rule 49(4). Furthermore the Co-Prosecutors may change their decision "at any time." Id. Rule
49(5).
56. At the ICC, the Prosecutor needs a "reasonable basis" to initiate an investigation. Rome
Statute, supra note 47, arts. 15(3)-(4), 53(1). Both the ICTY and the ICTR allow the Prosecutor to
initiate an investigation if there is a "sufficient basis." ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 18(1); ICTR
Statute, supra note 47, art. 17(1).
57. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 58(1).
58. SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, Rule 40 bis (B)(ii).
59. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, Rule 40 bis (B)(ii); ICTR Rules of
Evidence and Procedure, supranote 51, Rule No. 40 bis (B)(ii).
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The ECCC requires a "well founded reason to believe" that the charged person
committed the alleged crimes.60
The standard used to confirm an indictment and send a charged person to trial
is generally the second highest evidentiary standard used by a court, surpassed
only by the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard necessary for conviction. At the
ICC, the charges are subsequently confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber if there are
"substantial grounds to believe" that the person committed the specific crimes
charged. 6 1 At the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL, the prosecution must
demonstrate a primafacie case before the charged person is sent for trial.62 There
is no explicit standard for confirming an indictment at the ECCC, and the decision
is left to the discretion of the Co-Investigating Judges.63
The standard required to confirm an indictment is too high to trigger the
responsibility to protect doctrine. Generally, the confirmation of the indictment
comes after an extensive investigation of the facts and represents the best case the
prosecution can put forward at the close of its investigation. The time and effort
necessary to establish a primafacie case of crimes against humanity (or any of the
other crimes that can trigger the responsibility to protect) would simply be too
time-consuming 64 and difficult65 during a humanitarian crisis. The responsibility

60. ECCC Internal Rules, supranote 51, Rule 63(3)(a).
61. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 61(7).
62. At the ICTR and ICTY, the Prosecutor can issue an indictment if there is a prima facie case
that crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art.
17(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 17(4). A judge of the Trial Chamber then reviews the
indictment to see whether it establishes a primafacie case before confirming the indictment. ICTY
Statute, supra note 47, at art. 19(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 47, at art. 18(1). A similar process is used
at the SCSL. SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, at Rule 47(E)(ii) (stating the
reviewing judge shall approve the indictment if "the allegations in the Prosecution's case summary
would, if proven, amount to" a crime within the jurisdiction of the court).
63. ECCC Internal Rule 67 merely states that the case must be dismissed if there is "not sufficient
evidence" against the charged person, but does not indicate a specific standard that the evidence must
meet. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 51, at Rule 67(3)(c). In the first indictment at the ECCC,
involving Kaing Guek Eav, alias 'Duch', the Co-Investigating Judges adopted the language of Internal
Rule 67 and concluded that there was "sufficient evidence" to send Duch for trial. Closing Order
Indicting Kaing Guek Eay, alias 'Duch,' Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (Public Redacted
Version), 130 (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Duch Closing Order]. Duch did not appeal his indictment.
Consequently, there was no review by the Pre-Trial Chamber to see if the evidence was sufficient.
However, it is likely that one or more of the other suspects, if they are indicted, will challenge the
sufficiency of the indictment. This might lead to the Pre-Trial Chamber setting an explicit standard by
which to evaluate the indictments. It is also possible that the Internal Rules could be amended to
incorporate a specific standard.
64. Investigations at international courts routinely take a year or more. For example, the first
formal investigation at the ECCC began on July 18, 2007. See Press Release, Extraordinary Chambers
in the Court of Cambodia, Statement of the Co-Prosecutors, (July 18, 2007). The first indictment was
confirmed almost one year later. See Duch Closing Order, supranote 63.
65. Generally, criminal investigations require extensive access to documents and witnesses. It is
highly unlikely that the international community will have access to the requisite witnesses during the
early phases of the humanitarian disaster. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, for example, one of the key
complaints of the international community was that international experts did not have adequate access
to the country to coordinate the relief effort. See supranotes 19-20. Access would probably have been
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to protect doctrine must be triggered quickly if it to be of any use, which means
that there is no time to conduct a full investigation.
On the other hand, the threshold necessary to simply open an investigation at
an international court may be too low. The SCSL and the ECCC have subjective
or discretionary standards for initiation of an investigation. 66 These are insufficient
to trigger the responsibility to protect because the doctrine would be too
inconsistently applied if it were based on a purely subjective evaluation. The
standards used at the ICC, ICTY and ICTR seem more appropriate because they
require some sort of objective ("reasonable" or "sufficient") basis. The standards
for issuing an arrest warrant or placing a suspect in pre-trial detention are also
appealing for the same reason. While there is some variation in the wording, each
international court applies an objective standard. The ICTY and ICTR require a
"reliable and consistent" body of evidence, while the ICC, the SCSL, and the
ECCC use some variation of a "reasonable belief' standard.67
Ultimately, the actual wording is probably immaterial. Whether one calls it a
"reasonable basis," "sufficient basis," "reason to believe," "reasonable grounds to
believe," or "well founded reason to believe" or requires a "reliable or consistent"
body of evidence, in practice, it is probably very difficult to find any meaningful
difference in how the different tests would be applied to the same facts. Thus, the
author proposes using a test that is an amalgam of the various tests used by the
ICC, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ECCC to issue arrest warrants and place suspects in
pre-trial detention. Consequently, this article proposes that in order to trigger the
responsibility to protect, it is necessary to demonstrate an objectively reasonable
basis to believe that a crime against humanity has been committed. This
reasonable basis to believe will usually be based on a reliable and consistent body
of evidence.
The reporting described above in Section I is a reliable and consistent body of
evidence on many points. It comes from a variety of news sources, is internally
consistent, and is corroborated by the statements of aid organizations, human rights
organizations, and UN agencies. In short, this is exactly the sort of reliable and
consistent body of evidence that one would expect to be available in the immediate

even more limited if the international community had been seeking access for criminal investigators.
For example, investigators from the ICC have had difficulty getting access to Darfur to investigate
allegations of crimes being committed there. See International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells
Security Council Sudan's Government 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation, Massive Crimes
Continue, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2008/sc 9349.doc.htm; Alfred de Montesquiou, Sudan Announces it will Suspend Cooperation
with InternationalCriminal Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Mar. 18, 2007 (indicating that
Sudan would suspend all cooperation with the ICC in response to indictments issued against Sudanese
officials); Peter Quayle, Darfur - No Justice Without Peace?, TIMES (London), June 20, 2006, at 5
(indicating that, as of June 2006, no ICC investigator had been allowed into Sudan).
66. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment,
280-82 (Feb. 22, 2008)
(holding that the Prosecutor has unfettered discretion to determine who to investigate and change);
ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 51, at Rule 49(4) (explaining that Co-Prosecutors can "decide, at their
discretion," whether to accept or reject complaints).
67. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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aftermath of a humanitarian disaster and that one would expect the international
community to use as the basis for invoking the responsibility to protect. 68
B. The Existence of the Underlying Acts of a Crime Against Humanity
This section will discuss whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that
any of the enumerated crimes (sometimes also called the underlying acts) that form
the basis for a crime against humanity charge were committed in Myanmar in the
immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. With one notable exception,69 this section
will limit the inquiry to information that was available to the international
community within one month of the cyclone. This is being done for two reasons.
Firstly, by most accounts, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar, while still
severe, began to improve approximately one month after the cyclone, and secondly
the responsibility to protect must be invoked quickly for it to be meaningful. The
majority of the deaths probably occurred in the first month. Consequently, if the
responsibility to protect were not invoked until later, it would fail in its primary
objective - saving the lives of populations in danger. Accordingly, this section
will assume that a decision whether or not to invoke the responsibility to protect
would have been made during May 2008. Information that only became available
after that date might have exculpatory value in any eventual trials for alleged
crimes against humanity, but would not be relevant to whether the international
community could or should have invoked the responsibility to protect in the
immediate aftermath of the cyclone.
Not all of the enumerated acts that could constitute a crime against humanity
will be addressed below. The author has found no evidence to suggest that there
were widespread acts of enslavement, imprisonment, torture, or rape and sexual
violence. The discussion below will focus on the crimes of murder, extermination,
forcible transfer, persecution, and other inhumane acts. The issues of omission,
motive, and intent will be discussed first because of their importance to any
discussion of whether any of the underlying crimes were committed.
1. Intent and Motive
In order to commit a crime against humanity, the perpetrator must have the
intent to commit the underlying offense.70 Intent, of course, refers to the mental
state of the accused at the time the alleged crime was committed, but unless the
accused confesses or testifies, there is rarely any direct evidence of the accused's
mental state. For this reason, intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
68. See Joyner, supra note 52, at 713 n.73 (noting that the evidence necessary to invoke the
responsibility to protect could be "gleaned from independent human rights organizations, United
Nations observers, international media reports, eyewitness accounts of refugees, and national embassy
and diplomatic assessments").
69. See Burmese Endure in Spite ofJunta, Aid Workers Say, supranote 35.
70. Prosecutor v. Kordid & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 99 (Dec. 17, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, T 124 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid,
Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, T 37 (Nov. 29, 2002).
71. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 523 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting
that "in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number
of presumptions of fact"); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 387 (Sept. 1,
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Indeed, given that an accused can be convicted despite testifying that he or she did
not have the requisite intent, circumstantial evidence of intent can be more
convincing for the trier of fact than direct evidence of intent, presumably because it
is viewed as more objective than the accused's own testimony. Consequently, the
lack of "smoking gun" evidence of the intent to commit the underlying crimes
below does not mean that the requisite intent could not be established in a court.
Moreover, the concept of intent as used by most international courts does not
require proof of a deliberate purpose to commit the crimes. In many cases, courts
have held that an accused intended an act if he or she knew that the criminal
outcome was the probable result of an act or omission yet chose to commit the act
or omission anyway.72 This is similar to the common law concept of recklessness,
but has been held to constitute the requisite intent for prosecution of international
crimes. 71
Motive and intent are separate concepts and motive is generally irrelevant to
the question of criminal intent.74 Intent focuses on the question of what the
accused intended to do. Motive focuses on the question of why the accused did
something. 5 This distinction is important because the motive of the military junta,
whether it was to enrich itself, avoid scrutiny of its political system by outsiders,
hide the extent of the crisis from the world, or maintain its grip on power, is
irrelevant to the question of whether or not the junta intended the consequences of
its actions.
2. Crimes of Omission
The jurisprudence of the international courts demonstrates that crimes against
humanity can be caused either by acts of the accused or by omissions, if those
omissions are accompanied by the requisite criminal intent. For example, an
accused can be criminally liable for murder if he omits to act, while intending that
the omission will result in the death of the victim, and the victim dies as a result of

2004); International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes, General Introduction, 1 3, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part
II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes] ("Existence of intent and knowledge can be
inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.").
72. See cases cited infra notes 89-92.
73. Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 1561 (Jan. 14, 2000) ("The result is
intended when it is the actor's purpose, or the actor is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of
events.").
74. Kordi & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, at 1 99; Blaciki, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 1 124;
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 1 103 (June 12, 2002).
75. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment,
102 (Sept. 17, 2003) ("The
Appeals Chamber . . . recalls its case-law in the Jelisi6 case which, with regard to the specific intent
required for the crime of genocide, sets out 'the necessity to distinguish specific intent from motive.
The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal
economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive
does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.' It is the
Appeals Chamber's belief that this distinction between intent and motive must also be applied to the
other crimes laiddown in the Statute.") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-A,
Judgment, T 49 (July 5, 200 1).
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the omission.76 This is a very important point because some of those who argued
that the responsibility to protect did not apply to the situation in Myanmar took the
position that the junta's acts of omission were materially different from the sort of
deliberate state-sponsored killings that allegedly should trigger the responsibility to
protect. However, legally, this is not the case. Killing by omission, so long as it
is accompanied by the requisite criminal intent, is just as much a crime against
humanity as killing by commission.
3. Possible Scenarios
There are a number of allegations that could be made based on the facts
described above in Section I that, at first glance, resemble the underlying crimes of
a crime against humanity. These include: (1) the government's allegedly
deliberate failure to warn the population of the Irrawaddy Delta of the approaching
cyclone deprived them of the ability to seek shelter and greatly increased the death
toll; (2) the government's refusal of offered aid, combined with strict limits on the
amount of aid that was allowed into the country, the refusal to provide visas to
international experts, and the insistence that the junta control the distribution of the
aid despite its demonstrated lack of capacity to do so greatly increased the number
of deaths and also created inhumane living conditions for many of the survivors;
(3) the junta's diversion of humanitarian aid that was intended for survivors
resulted in increased deaths and the creation of inhumane living conditions; and (4)
the forcible transfer of survivors out of government-run camps and back to their
villages resulted in additional deaths and the creation of inhumane living
conditions. Each of these possibilities will be explored below.
a. The Denial of Aid to Survivors
As described above in Section I, during the first three weeks of the crisis the
Myanmar government refused aid from some countries, strictly limited the amount
of aid entering the country, refused visa requests from experts in disaster
assessment and aid distribution and insisted that it control the distribution of the
aid.7' At the same time, it was alleged that the junta was ill-equipped and poorly

76. Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 556 (Jan. 17, 2005) ("In
the jurisprudence of both the Tribunal and the ICTR, murder has consistently been defined as the death
of the victim which results from an act or omission by the accused, committed with the intent either to
kill or to cause serious bodily harm with the reasonable knowledge that it would likely lead to death.");
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1485 (Aug. 2, 2001); Blaikit, Case No. IT-9514-T, at 217; Prosecutor v. Kordid & (erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 236 (Feb. 26,
2001).
77. See Thakur, supra note 41 (suggesting that the responsibility to protect could be invoked to
"halt large-scale killings" but that it did not apply to deaths caused by a natural disaster); The UN and
HumanitarianIntervention: To ProtectSovereignty, or to Protect Lives?, supranote 38 (suggesting that
the responsibility to protect was "never intended to cope with the aftermath of natural disasters" and
distinguishing natural disasters from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic
cleansing); Saechao & Rao, supra note 41 (suggesting that a natural disaster cannot constitute a crime
against humanity).
78. This is not the first time that a country has refused aid to its own people for political reasons.
See Tyra Ruth Saechao, Note, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to
Clarity, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 663, 687-90 (2007) (describing North Korea's control over and rejection

244

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

prepared to mount an effective response on its own, and it was well-known that the
vast majority of the victims were not receiving any aid at all. This was all
happening, despite the availability of international aid, because the government
refused to allow that aid to enter the country in sufficient amounts. There was also
a widespread belief that the junta's intransigence was resulting in the deaths of
people who had survived the initial storm surge and could have been saved if aid
had been made available promptly. 79 This is probably the strongest argument that
the actions of the military junta constituted crimes against humanity. These deaths
would most likely be treated as murder, extermination, or other inhumane acts.
Murder will be addressed first.
L Murder
Murder as a crime against humanity requires three elements: (1) the death of a
person; (2) that was caused by an act or omission of the accused, or of a person or
persons for whose acts or omissions the accused bears criminal responsibility; and
(3) the act was done, or the omission was made, by the accused, or a person or
persons for whose acts or omissions he/she bears criminal responsibility, with an
intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm or serious injury, in the reasonable
knowledge that such act or omission was likely to cause death. 0 There is no need
to produce a body so long as there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that the
victim is dead.
There seems to have been a widespread belief amongst diplomats and aid
agencies working on the crisis that people were dying in the Irrawaddy Delta
because of a lack of aid.82 The World Food Program initially indicated that it was
only being allowed to bring in 10 percent of the needed aid, and even after three
weeks the United Nations estimated that 75 percent of the survivors had received
no aid at all.83 Surveys conducted after the cyclone indicated that nearly 60
percent of the houses in the Irrawaddy Delta had been destroyed, that 60 percent of
the population did not have access to clean water, and that more than half of the
households lost all their food stocks.84 It would have been reasonable at the time
to conclude from these facts that deaths were occurring that would not have
occurred if aid had been distributed. The author has not found any estimates of
how many people died because of a lack of aid, but it is probably not necessary to
know the exact number of deaths or even to have a reliable estimate of the deaths
at the stage of invoking the responsibility to protect.
On the other hand, at least one report from late June 2008 suggested that the
death toll from the lack of aid had not been as high as initially expected. 5 This
of international aid that was offered in response to a widespread famine that occurred during the 1990s).
79. UN Frustrated at Burma Response, BBC NEWS, May 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/asia-pacific /7397012.stm.
80. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 381 (Sept 1, 2004).
81. Id. at 383-85.
82. See supranote 25.
83. See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text.
84. See supranotes 4-6.
85. See Burmese Endure in Spite ofJunta, Aid Workers Say, supranote 35.
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would not affect the question of whether or not the responsibility to protect could
have been invoked during May because that decision would depend on the
information that was available in May, and there seemed to be reason to believe at
the time that large numbers of deaths were occurring. Nor would it affect whether
murder had occurred. A single death can be murder, and even the most optimistic
reports do not suggest that there were no deaths. It would, however, have a
bearing on whether or not extermination could have occurred.
The next element of a murder charge would be evidence that the deaths were
caused by an act or omission of the government of Myanmar. The deaths were
caused by the government if an act or omission of the government contributed
substantially to the deaths. 7 As noted above, there appear to have been deaths
occurring that were caused by the lack of aid. This lack of aid was the result of an
act or omission of the Myanmar government. The international community
recognized the severity of the crisis within days and aid was quickly mobilized.
In addition to aid, the international community was also willing to provide disaster
assessment experts, search and rescue teams, experts in aid distribution, and
transportation of the aid to the areas that most needed it.8 9 Nonetheless, there
appears to have been a conscious decision taken by the military junta to reject aid
from some countries and to impose strict limits on the amount of aid that entered
the country. 90 These restrictions prevented the majority of people from receiving
aid and therefore contributed substantially to some deaths. In short, there does
seem to be a credible body of evidence indicating that some of the deaths were
caused by an act or omission of the government.
The final element of murder as a crime against humanity is criminal intent. A
plausible argument can be made that the junta intended for the deaths to occur.
First of all, the required intent for murder as a crime against humanity
encompasses both direct intent and indirect intent. 91 Direct intent is a deliberate
purpose to kill someone. Indirect intent is similar to a recklessness standard.
Accused are found to have legally intended to kill someone if they were aware that
the death was a probable consequence of their acts or omissions, they act or omit to
act anyway, and the death does occur.92 To be intended, the death must be
86. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
87. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 382 (Sept. 1, 2004).
88. See supranote 15.
89. See supranotes 16-18 and accompanying text.
90. See supranotes 18-23 and accompanying text.
91. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, 1 235 (Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgment, T 270 (July 17, 2008). Indirect intent is also sometimes
referred to by the Latin name dolus eventualis.
92. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 386 (referring to indirect intent as dolus eventualis). In
the Stakit case, the Trial Chamber described indirect intent as "if the actor engages in life-endangering
behaviour, his killing becomes intentional if he 'reconciles himself' or 'makes peace' with the
likelihood of death." Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, T 587 (July 31, 2003). The
court went on to say that even conduct of minimal risk can qualify as intentional homicide if done with
manifest indifference to the value of human life. Id. However, other courts that have addressed the
standard appear to have taken the position that a minimal risk of death is insufficient and there must be
a probability of death before the act can be considered intentional. See Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T,
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probable, not simply possible.93 In this respect, indirect intent encompasses
recklessness but not negligence or gross negligence.94
The actions of the Myanmar government in response to Cyclone Nargis
appear to be an example of indirect intent. It was widely known that hundreds of
thousands of people were in need of assistance and that some of those people
would probably die if they did not receive aid. Given the level of international
media coverage, the government can hardly argue that it was unaware of the
situation in the Irrawaddy Delta. The aid was available, yet the government either
refused the aid or limited the amount of aid that it admitted, knowing that it was
probable that deaths would occur. This is sufficient to draw a conclusion that the
government intended to cause the deaths. The junta's motive for refusing the aid,
whether it was general paranoia, a desire to control the information available to the
rest of the world, or simply a desire to retain absolute power in Myanmar, is
irrelevant. 95 Consequently, in May 2008 there was a reliable and consistent body
of evidence that established a reasonable basis to believe that murder as a crime
against humanity was occurring in the Irrawaddy Delta.
ii Extermination
It is also possible that the junta's actions constituted extermination as a crime
against humanity. Extermination requires proof of two elements: (1) that an act or
omission resulted in the death of persons on a massive scale, and (2) the accused
intended to kill persons on a massive scale or to create conditions of life that lead
to the death of a large number of people. 96 Extermination is similar in many ways
to murder, except that it occurs on a massive scale,97 and it may be proved by
evidence that victims were intentionally subjected to conditions that contributed to
their deaths, such as the deprivation of food and medicine.98 Consequently, many
of the arguments made above with respect to murder also apply to the analysis of
extermination. For example, the intent element of extermination is the same as
that for murder and encompasses both direct and indirect intent. 99
The discussion of murder as a crime against humanity has already established
that there was reason to believe that people were dying as a result of the acts or
omissions of the Myanmar government and that those acts or omissions were
at T235-36.
93. See Strugar,Case No. IT-01-42-T, at
235-36.
94. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at 1 386; Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, at 1270; Staki5, Case
No. IT-97-24-T, at T 587.
95. See Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 1 99 (Dec. 17, 2004);
see also cases cited supranote 74.
96. Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 572 (Jan. 17, 2005);
Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 388. See also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 71, at art.
7(1)(b).
97. Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 388.
98. Id. at 1 389; see also Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 503 (Aug. 2,
2001); Rome Statute, supra note 47, at art. 7(2)(b) ("'Extermination' includes the intentional infliction
of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population.").
99. Staki5, Case No. IT-97-24-T, at 1 642; Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 395.
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intentional. The only additional element necessary for there to be extermination is
that the deaths occurred on a massive scale. There is no minimum number of
victims needed to satisfy the "massive" requirement, and the applicability of
extermination must be based on a case-by-case analysis of all the relevant
factors. 100 Nevertheless, in the Brdanin Trial Judgment, the court concluded that
the deaths of at least 1,669 people was sufficiently massive to be considered
extermination. 101 If less than 2,000 deaths can be considered massive, then the
apparent scope of the deaths in Myanmar should probably be considered massive
as well. As noted above, the author has found no credible estimates of how many
people died due to a lack of aid in the weeks immediately following Cyclone
Nargis. However, the United Nations estimated that 2.4 million people were
severely affected by the cyclone. 102 75 percent of them had not received any aid
more than three weeks after the cyclone.1 0 3 At the time, these figures would have
provided reason to believe that deaths were occurring on a sufficiently massive
scale for those deaths to be considered extermination as a crime against humanity.
However, reports from June 2008 indicate that the death toll from the lack of
aid seemed to be lower than initially predicted. 104 This would not affect whether
the responsibility to protect could have been invoked in May because the
information was not available at that time, but it could impact any eventual judicial
determination of whether extermination did occur. The lower the actual number of
deaths, the less likely it is that extermination occurred.
ii InhumaneActs
This section will examine whether the government's decision to limit aid
resulted in starvation, lack of housing, and lack of medical care for the inhabitants
of the Irrawaddy Delta and, if so, whether it constituted an inhumane act. While
murder and extermination focus on killings, the category of "other inhumane acts"
is a residual category of crimes against humanity which criminalizes other acts of
similar gravity to those that are specifically enumerated in the definition of crimes
against humanity.1 05 Acts are considered inhumane if: (1) the victim suffered
serious bodily or mental harm or a serious attack on human dignity, (2) the
suffering was the result of an act or omission of the accused or someone for whom
the accused bears criminal responsibility, and (3) the accused or the person for
whom the accused bears criminal responsibility intended to inflict the suffering
upon the victim. 106 The severity of the act must be of "similar seriousness" to the
100. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 1 573; Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at 391;
Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, at 1 640; Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, 716
(Sept. 27, 2006).
101. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at
465. The Brdanin Trial Judgment also noted that
extermination had been found in other cases when as few as 733 persons had died. Id. at 381 n.926.
102. See TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supranote 1, at 1.
103. See Mydans, supranote 10.
104. See Burmese Endure in Spite ofJunta, Aid Workers Say, supranote 35.
105. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 1 624; Prosecutor v. Kordid & erkez, Case No.
IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 117 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment,
152 (Dec. 5,2003).
106. Kordi6 & Oerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, at I 11; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-
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enumerated crimes against humanity. 107 As with murder and extermination, intent
can be demonstrated by either direct or indirect intent.108
While there is a reasonable inference that people died as a result of the
Myanmar government's decision to limit the amount of aid, 109 it is virtually
undisputedo that approximately 75 percent of the 2.4 million people severely
affected by the cyclone received no aid at all during the first three weeks of the
crisis."
As noted above, approximately 60 percent of these survivors had no
housing, inadequate access to water, and no food. 112 In addition, the cyclone
damaged almost 75 percent of the health facilities in the Irrawaddy Delta, which
resulted in a "considerable decline in health service provision."1 3 More than 65%
of households reported health problems in the weeks after the cyclone, including
fevers and diarrhea.1 14 Consequently, there is a credible body of evidence that
suggests that a very large number of people suffered a lack of shelter, food, clean
water, and medical care.
Many of the people who received no aid would have received aid if the
government had not imposed limits on the amount of aid it accepted. The exact
number of people affected by the government's decision is difficult to estimate,
although news reports suggest that it was probably hundreds of thousands of
people."' Thus, the government's decision to refuse aid caused the additional
suffering 16 of those people who would have received help if not for its decision to
refuse aid. Moreover, the government was certainly aware from international
media reports that its actions would result in the cyclone survivors being left

32-A, Judgment, 165 (Feb. 25, 2004); see also Blagojevit & Jokie, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 626;
Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, at T 152; see also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 71, at art. 7(1)(k).
107. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-A, at T 165; Blagojevit & Jokit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 627.
108. See id. at 1 628 ("It is required that the perpetrator, at the time of the act or omission, had the
intention to inflict serious physical or mental suffering or to commit a serious attack on the human
dignity of the victim(s), or that the perpetrator knew that his act or omission was likely to cause such
suffering to, or amount to a serious attack on, the human dignity of the victim(s) and, with that
knowledge, acted or failed to act."). See also Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, at 1 154; Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, T 132 (Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT95-9-T, Judgment, T 76 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment,
236 (Nov. 29, 2002).
109. See supra Section II(B)(3)(a)(i).
110. The Myanmar government did claim that everyone had received aid, see supra note 89, but
this appears to be untrue.
111. See supranote 27; Mydans, U.N. ChiefSays Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, supranote 20.
112. See supranotes 4-6 and accompanying text.
113. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supranote 1, at 7-8.

114. Id. at 8.
115. See Cooper & Shanker, supranote 10 (noting that French naval vessels carrying 1,500 tons of
food were denied permission to offload their cargo); see also InternationalPressure on Myanmar Junta
is Building, supra, note 20 (noting that the French vessels held enough food to feed 100,000 people for
15 days); Schmitt, supra note 2 (noting that while 1.5 million pounds of supplies had been brought in
by U.S. planes, "much more" could be brought in from the waiting U.S. naval vessels).
116. Some amount of suffering would have been caused by the cyclone itself. The government
would only be liable for that additional suffering that was caused by the lack of aid. See supra Section
II(B)(3)(a)(iii) (explaining that inhumane acts require an act or omission).
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Consequently, the government

In effect, this makes out virtually all the elements of the crime of inhumane
acts: large numbers of people suffered as a result of the government's decision to
refuse aid, and this suffering was an intended result of the refusal of aid. The only
question that remains is whether the denial of food, water, housing, and medical
care constitutes a serious bodily or mental harm or a serious attack on human
dignity. The denial of food, water, housing, and medical care, when done in
conjunction with other acts like unlawful imprisonment, physical and
psychological abuse, or beatings, does constitute an inhumane act.117 It is less
clear whether the denial of these things, standing alone, constitutes an inhumane
act, although at least one case has appeared to hold that it does."
The key question is whether the lack of food, water, housing and medical care
subjected the survivors to severe mental or physical harm or a severe attack on
human dignity. This evaluation must be done on a case-by-case basis and with due
regard for the individual circumstances of the victims.H 9 This means that whether
or not the lack of aid was an inhumane act depends on the particular circumstances
of the crisis and of the victims. In the cyclone's aftermath, many of the survivors
lost family members and almost everything they owned. In addition, conditions in
many parts of the Irrawaddy Delta were terrible. Whole villages were destroyed.
Many areas remained underwater for long periods of time, and rotting and
decomposing bodies were a common sight. 12 0 The combination of the lack of aid
and the terrible conditions appear to have inflicted severe physical and mental
trauma on some survivors.12 1 This physical and mental suffering is the hallmark of

an inhumane act. Thus, there is reason to believe that the government's actions
117. Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 155 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment,
97, 773, 775 (Oct. 17, 2003); Blagojevi6 & Jokid, Case No.
IT-02-60-T, Judgment,
605-10 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Nikolid, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S,
Judgment, TT 36-37 (Dec. 2, 2003).
118. Blaiki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A, at 1 155 ("The Appeals Chamber considers that the acts
charged in the Indictment which encompass the detention of Bosnian Muslim civilians who were killed,
used as human shields, beaten, subjected to physical or psychological abuse and intimidation, inhumane
treatment, and deprived of adequate food and water, all rise to the level of gravity of the other crimes
enumerated in Article 5.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). While the decision on inhumane acts is
limited to a single paragraph, it does seem to hold that each of the acts described, including deprivation
of food and water, individually constitutes an inhumane act.
119. See Prosecutor v. Kordid & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, T 117 (Dec. 17,2004).
120. See supra note 7. See also Mydans, Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort,
supra note 7 ("Relief workers and survivors described scenes of horror as people huddled on spits of
dry ground surrounded by bodies and animal carcasses floating in the murky water or lodged in
mangrove trees."); In Flooded Delta, a Want as Pervasive as Death, supra note 6 ("In the village of
Day Da Nam . . . residents said the remains of 28 farmers killed by the storm were still floating in the
falling floodwaters."); Weeks After Cyclone in Myanmar, Even Farmers Wait for Food, supra note 6
("'Dead bodies floating down the Pyapon river are no longer strangers to us."').
121. See Monks Succeed in Cyclone Reliefas Junta Falters,supra note 34 (describing one woman
who lost the eight other members of her family and was contemplating suicide); id. (quoting a doctor as
saying, "'Our patients suffer from infected wounds, abdominal pains and vomiting. They also need
counseling for mental trauma, anxiety and depression."').
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constituted the crime of inhumane acts.
iv. Persecution
Persecution requires: (1) an act; (2) that discriminates in fact and denies or
infringes upon a fundamental right; and (3) that was carried out with the intent to
discriminate based on political, national, racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender,
or other impermissible grounds. 122 The underlying acts that can constitute
persecution must be of equal gravity to the enumerated acts of a crime against
humanity, 12 and thus include but are not limited to the enumerated acts. 124 This
means that the acts described above that constitute murder, extermination and
inhumane acts would also constitute persecution if they discriminated in fact and
were carried out with the requisite discriminatory intent. Discrimination occurs
when the victim is targeted because of his or her membership in a group defined by
the perpetrator on any of the discriminatory grounds. 125 The victim does not have
to be an actual member of the targeted group, so long as the perpetrator believes
the victim to be associated with the targeted group. 126 The culpable act must result
in actual discrimination against the victim. 127
The facts described above do not seem to constitute sufficient evidence of
persecution to invoke the responsibility to protect. There is no reliable and
consistent body of evidence that indicates that the decision to deny aid to survivors
living in the Irrawaddy Delta was based on the government's identification of them
as being members of a particular political, national, racial, ethnic, cultural, or
religious group. Rather, it appears that all of the survivors were mistreated in a
similar fashion. There may have been instances where supporters of the
government or members of political groups affiliated with the government received
aid in situations where those who were not affiliated with the government were
denied aid. 128 If this occurred, it could be persecution because access to aid would
be based on membership in a favored political group, and the denial of aid to
disfavored groups would result in discrimination in fact. However, there is not a
reliable and credible body of evidence indicating that this was occurring regularly
or systematically. Consequently, the government's actions do not appear to have
been persecutory.

122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Deronjid, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgment,
109 (July 20, 2005)
(describing the elements of a persecution charge). The list of groups that can be discriminated against
is taken from art. 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1)(h).
123. See, e.g., Kordit & cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 1 102.
124. Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, T 219 (Sept. 17, 2003); Prosecutor
v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 994 (Sept. 1, 2004).
125. See Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 583 (Jan. 17, 2005).
126. Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, 1 49 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, T 734 (July 31, 2003).
127. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, T 113 (Feb. 25, 2004); Blagojevi
& Jokit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 1583 (Jan. 17, 2005).
128. This seems likely given the allegations of diversion of aid to supporters of the government.
See supra note 23. One possible consequence of the diversion of aid is that supporters of the military
government received preferential treatment over those who were not affiliated with the government.
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b. The Diversion of Aid
There is some evidence that aid intended for the survivors of the cyclone was
diverted by members of the military either for their own use or so that it could be
sold to victims for a profit, 129 and this may have resulted in increased deaths and
the creation of inhumane living conditions. This scenario is being treated
separately from the refusal of aid and the junta's strict control over how much aid
was imported and how it was distributed because it is not clear that the diversion of
aid was an official policy of the government. While there are some indications that
the diversion of aid happened systematically,130 there are also instances that appear
to have been initiated by local officials or military personnel.131
Diversion of aid probably constitutes the same underlying crimes discussed
above with regard to the junta's refusal of aid for the same reasons. The diversion
of aid in a situation where people are dying because of lack of food, water, shelter,
and medical care, could constitute murder as a crime against humanity if the
person diverting the aid knew that death was a probable outcome of the act. The
diversion of aid could also constitute an inhumane act if it caused severe mental or
physical suffering for the survivors who were denied aid as a result. It would be
difficult to argue that the diversion of aid constituted extermination unless it
happened on a massive scale. If it happened only sporadically, then it seems
unlikely that the resulting number of deaths would be massive. If, however,
diversion occurred systematically across the whole Irrawaddy Delta, then it begins
to look like extermination.
The issue of whether the diversion of aid was a systematic policy of the junta
has no bearing on whether the individual acts of diversion constitutes the
underlying acts of a crime against humanity. It does, however, impact on who
might be legally responsible and whether or not they would be tried. If the
diversion was not a systematic policy of the government, then the people who bear
the criminal responsibility for the resulting crimes might be mostly local officials.
It is unlikely that the international community would attempt to prosecute such
low-level people. 132 Moreover, for purposes of invoking the responsibility to
protect, if the occurrences of diversion are sporadic, then the "attack" may not be
widespread or systematic enough to warrant the conclusion that a crime against
humanity is underway. 133 Ultimately, the evidence indicates that some acts of
diversion probably did result in the commission of underlying crimes, but the

129. See supranote 23.
130. Aid Groups Say Myanmar Food Stolen by Military, supra note 18 ("The directors of several
relief organizations in Myanmar said Wednesday that some of the international aid arriving into the
country for the victims of Cyclone Nargis was being stolen, diverted or warehoused by the country's
army.").
131. When Burmese Offer a Hand,Rulers Slap It, supra note 19 (reporting allegations that local
military officials had received good rice from the United Nations but kept it for themselves and
distributed rotten rice to the cyclone survivors).
132. See infra notes 251-256 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Section II(C)(2) (discussing the requirement that the attack be widespread or
systematic).
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evidence seems too inconsistent and too sparse to warrant concluding that the
diversion of aid was a systematic policy of the Myanmar government.
Consequently, it is doubtful whether the responsibility to protect could have been
invoked solely in response to these acts.
c. The Forcible Eviction of Survivors from Aid Camps
Towards the end of May and into early June, the junta apparently began a
policy of forcibly transferring survivors out of government-run aid camps and back
to their villages, 13 4 which may have resulted in additional deaths and the creation
of inhumane living conditions for the victims. The forcible displacements began in
late May and coincided with the government's announcement that the rescue phase
of the response was over.135 The displacements affected thousands of people,
many of whom had nowhere to go. 136
The forcible transfer of persons from one location to another can constitute a
crime against humanity. Historically, the definition of crimes against humanity
has expressly prohibited only deportations,137 which require that the person be
forced to cross an international border.138 However, forcible transfers that occur
entirely within the borders of a country are also prohibited. For example, the
Rome Statute expressly includes forcible transfer in its list of enumerated crimes in
the definition of crimes against humanity. 139 Other courts, like the ICTY, have
used their jurisprudence to extend the definition of crimes against humanity to
include forcible transfers by treating them as a special form of "other inhumane
acts." 140
The crime of forcible transfer requires: (1) the forcible displacement of
persons; (2) from an area in which they are lawfully present; (3) without grounds
permitted under international law. 14 1 For the displacement to be forcible, it must
be involuntary, but it does not have to be the result of physical force.
Displacement is forced if it is the result of force, threats of force, coercion, fear of
violence, psychological oppression, or abuse of power. 142 The perpetrator must act

134. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. It appears that the evictions occurred too
frequently for them to be uncoordinated.
135. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 3; Monks Succeed in Cyclone Relief as Junta Falters,
supranote 34; Mydans, Myanmar Rules Still Impeding Access, supranote 2.
136. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 4-5; Mydans, supranote 33.
137. Most of the constituent documents of international criminal tribunals prior to the Rome Statute
explicitly prohibited deportations but not forcible transfers. See supra note 47.
138. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 544 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, T 122 (Oct. 17, 2003), Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24T, Judgment, T 672 (Jul. 31, 2003).
139. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1)(d).
140. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T 544; Staki, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 1 671; Prosecutor v.
Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 523 (Aug. 2, 2001).
141. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T 544; Simit, Case No. IT-95-9-T, T 122; Stakit, Case No. IT97-24-T, 1 672; see also Rome Statute, supranote 47, art. 7(2)(d) ("'Deportation or forcible transfer of
population' means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.").
142. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T 543; Simit, Case No. IT-95-9-T, T 125; Stakit, Case No. IT-
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with intent that the victims be removed and that they not return.143 There is no
minimum number of people who must be displaced.144
The forcible removal of people from government-run aid camps, schools and
monasteries in late May looks like a forcible transfer. Although the exact nature of
the coercion is rarely described in the reports, the circumstances leave little doubt
that the displacement was involuntary. There is no indication that the people were
in the Irrawaddy Delta unlawfully, and it appears that the justification offered by
the government - the need to switch from relief efforts to reconstruction - was a
sham. 145 Finally, the removals appear to have been done deliberately with the goal
of removing the persons from the places they had congregated and not allowing
them to return. In short, it appears that all of the elements of a forcible transfer as
a crime against humanity are present.
Moreover, the forcible transfers might serve as the acts that give rise to other
crimes, including murder and other inhumane acts. Assuming that the individuals
ordering the evictions knew that there was nowhere for the survivors to go once
they were evicted and that aid was not reaching the vast majority of the survivors,
they might be liable for any deaths from disease and starvation that resulted from
the evictions. They might also be liable for the severe mental or physical suffering
of the people who were evicted but had nowhere to go. On balance, there appears
to be reliable and consistent evidence that crimes resulted from the government's
policy of forcibly evicting cyclone survivors from aid camps.
However, the timing of the forcible transfers suggests that they would not
have been useful in invoking the responsibility to protect. Most of the forcible
transfers seem to have begun in late May and continued into June. However, by
this point, the amount of aid entering the country was increasing and the crisis was
becoming less severe. In other words, even if the forcible transfers could have
been used to invoke the responsibility to protect, they occurred after the worst of
the harm had already occurred. To be effective in its stated goal of saving lives,
the responsibility to protect would have to have been invoked earlier in the crisis.
d. The Failure to Warn
Allegations have been made that the Myanmar government knew that
Cyclone Nargis was going to hit the Irrawaddy Delta but failed to notify the
population. 146 If these allegations are true, the military junta might be criminally
97-24-T, 1 682; Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-T, T 529.
143. Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T, 1545; Stakit, Case No. IT-97-24-T, TT 686-687.
144. Staki, Case No. IT-97-24-T, T 685.
145. The international community rejected the government's contention that the relief phase of the
crisis was complete. See supranote 28.
146. See supra note 14. However, there are several news articles in the days immediately before
the cyclone struck that suggest Myanmar was making some effort to warn its population. See Cyclone
Lashes Myanmar After Missing Bangladesh, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 1, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5glRRGj6eAYhPLa8JFCEfyDvzOPgA
("Myanmar's state-run
newspapers have run warnings about the impending storm."); Nargis Gets a Move, Readies for
Landfall, HINDu BUSINESS LINE, May 2, 2005, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2008/05/02/stories/2008050250281100.htm (noting that Myanmar had "already set into motion a
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liable for some of the tens of thousands of deaths that were caused by the storm
surge. 147 Depending on the facts, these deaths could be described as murder and
extermination because some people that died as a result of the storm surge would
have lived if they had been warned in advance. These would be the deaths caused
by the failure to wam.
On closer examination, however, there does not seem to be much substance to
the allegation. To prove the requisite intent, it would be necessary to prove that
the government either directly intended the deaths or knew that the deaths were a
probable outcome of the decision not to warn the population. While it was
relatively easy, after the fact, to claim that the deaths were foreseeable and that the
failure to warn was a culpable omission, there does not seem to have been a
widespread awareness, prior to Cyclone Nargis' landfall, of how destructive it
would be. There are many news articles that mention Cyclone Nargis in the days
that lead up to May 2,148 but none of the ones the author was able to locate
suggested that the cyclone would cause a humanitarian crisis on the scale that it
did. 149
Given that the international community apparently did not recognize the
potential destructiveness of Cyclone Nargis in advance, it would be hard to argue
that the Myanmar government knew that its failure to warn would probably lead to
widespread deaths. Therefore, it does not appear that the requisite intent for the
crimes of murder or extermination existed. On balance, there is not a reasonable
basis to believe that the failure to warn the population constituted a crime against
humanity.

disaster preparedness drill" after having been notified about the impending storm).
147. Tyra Saechao has previously argued that there is an international obligation to wam about
impending natural disasters and that states might be legally responsible for a failure to warn. See
Saechao, supra note 78, at 681-85. This is similar to but conceptually different from the question of
whether or not there is individual criminal liability arising out of a failure to wam.
148. A LexisNexis search run by the author retrieved 33 news reports that mention Cyclone Nargis
on or before May 2, 2008. Some of them describe the storm as severe with high winds and rough seas,
but none of them suggest that it will result in a humanitarian catastrophe. For a fairly representative
selection of these articles, see Cyclone Lashes Myanmar After Missing Bangladesh,supra note 146;
Tropical Cyclone Nargis Gains in Strength on Way Toward Myanmar, BLOOMBERG, May 2, 2008,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=\aROBCBZCzWs&refer-asia#; Severe Cyclone Nargis Over Bay
Moves Eastwardsin Frequent Change of Course, U. NEWS OF BANGLADESH, May 2, 2008, available at
LexisNexis; Squally Winds Reach 73 Kmph, City Gears Up for Rain, HINDU (India), April 30, 2008,
available at http://www.thehindu.com/2008
/04/30/stories/2008043059530400.htn; B'desh Raises Storm Alert, Urges Swift Rice Harvest,REUTERS,
April 29, 2008, available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DHA224084.htm.
149. Only a few articles describe indicate concern about the storm. See B'desh Raises Storm Alert,
Urges Swift Rice Harvest,supra note 148 (noting that the government of Bangladesh had issued a storm
warning and urged coastal residents to be ready for a quick evacuation); Bangladesh Prepares to Meet
Cyclone Nargis, INDo-ASiAN NEWS SERVICE, May 2, 2008, available at LexisNexis (noting that
Bangladesh had asked fishermen to return to port and had activated its disaster management facilities
and cyclone shelters); VOA News: Bangladesh's Farmers Told Not to Panic about Approaching
Cyclone, US FED NEWS, April 29, 2008, available at LexisNexis (warning that the storm could damage
Bangladesh's rice crop).
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e. Conclusion
This section examined four factual situations that could have constituted the
underlying crimes of a crime against humanity. Upon analysis, it appears that only
two of these situations could have given rise to a reasonable belief that the
underlying crimes of a crime against humanity were being committed. Moreover,
for one of these two situations - the forcible eviction of cyclone survivors from aid
camps - it appears that the relevant acts began occurring in late May. Thus, the
forcible transfers could not have been used to invoke the responsibility to protect
during the most critical period - the first three weeks of the crisis. Only the
government's refusal of aid, limitations on how much was allowed into the
country, and strict control over the distribution of aid is supported by credible
evidence that gives rise to a reasonable belief that the underlying criminal acts of a
crime against humanity, including murder, extermination and inhumane acts, were
occurring during the critical period.
However, this is not enough by itself to invoke the responsibility to protect or
to conclude that crimes against humanity were committed. To constitute a crime
against humanity, the underlying crimes must be committed in connection with a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population,15 0 and the perpetrator
must know the attack is taking place and that his acts are part of the attack. 151 The
following section will evaluate whether the government's refusal of aid, limitations
on aid, and control over the distribution of aid occurred in the context of an attack
on the civilian population of the Irrawaddy Delta. It will also look at whether the
architects of that policy knew an attack was taking place and that their acts or
omissions were part of the attack.
C. Did an Attack Take Place?
It is now generally agreed that the customary international law definition of
crimes against humanity requires that crimes against humanity take place in
connection with a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.
Initially, as the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict was disappearing from
the customary international law definition of crimes against humanity, there was
some uncertainty about what jurisdictional requirement would take its place. 15 2
Consequently, some of the statutes of the international tribunals that were
negotiated in the early 1990s include elements different from or in addition to an

150. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1); SCSL Statute, supranote 47, art. 2; ICTR Statute,
supranote 47, art. 3; ECCC Law, art. 5.
151. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 1 190 (Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Kordi6 & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 1 100 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 99 (Jun. 12, 2002).
152. See generally Stuart Ford, Crimes Against Humanity at the ExtraordinaryChambers in the
Courts of Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125
(2007) (describing the early development of crimes against humanity and the transition from requiring a
nexus with armed conflict to the modem requirement of a nexus with a widespread or systematic attack
on a civilian population).
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attack on a civilian population.1 53 For example, the ICTY Statute requires the
attack to be committed during an armed conflict, 154 but ICTY jurisprudence
acknowledges the customary requirement that the crimes take place as part of an
attack on a civilian population. 155 The ICTR and the ECCC both require that the
attack be "on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,"1 56 but this
discriminatory purpose is not part of the customary definition of the attack.15 7 The
Rome Statute, which was negotiated in 1998 and has now been ratified by 108
states,1 58 is generally accepted to state the customary international law definition of
the contextual requirement: 159
'crime against humanity' means any of the following [enumerated] acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population. 160
This attack requirement is often referred to as a jurisdictional or contextual
element because the existence of the attack is a prerequisite to charging crimes
against humanity, but the prosecution does not have to prove that the accused
caused the attack or intended the attack. The prosecution only needs to show that
the accused was aware of the facts that constituted the attack and knew that his or
her acts formed part of the attack. 16 1 The motive of the perpetrator is irrelevant1 62
and it is not necessary to show that the perpetrator approved of or desired the
attack. 163 Nor does the perpetrator need to know all the details of the attack. It is
sufficient if the perpetrator knows the attack is taking place. 164

153. See id. at 173-79 (describing the lingering uncertainty in the definition of crimes against
humanity and its affect on the drafting of the Rome Statute, the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute).
154. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 5.
155. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 181; Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, T 541 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 130 (Sept.
1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, 1 37 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 621 (Jul. 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-9623 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, T 410 (Jun. 12, 2002).
156. See ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 3; ECCC Law, supra note 47, art. 5.
157. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
287-292 (Jul. 15, 1999)
(discussing the customary international law definition of crimes against humanity and concluding that it
does not require a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity and that a discriminatory intent
is only required for the underlying crime of persecution); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4A, Judgment,
464-466 (Jun. 1, 2001) (concluding that a discriminatory purpose is not a component
of the customary international law definition of all crimes against humanity).
158. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties
(last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
159. See Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the
Elements of CrimesAgainst Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73, 140-42 (2004).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1).
161. See supranote 148.
162. See supranote 73.
163. Prosecutor v. Kordid & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 1 99 (Dec. 17, 2004)
("'[T]he accused need not share the purpose or goal behind the attack."'); Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case
No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 124 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment,
103 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 1548 (Jan. 17,
2005); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 138 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v.
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1. The Meaning of Attack
An attack is generally defined by the ICC and the ICTR as an unlawful act or
series of acts of the kind enumerated in the definition of crimes against
humanity. 165 In other words, the jurisdictional prerequisite for charging crimes
against humanity is proof of a course of conduct that involves the commission of
the underlying acts that constitute crimes against humanity. It may seem circular
to require proof of the commission of the underlying acts in order to try someone
for commission of the underlying acts; but it is not because the attack has to be
widespread or systematic. Thus, to charge someone for one of the underlying acts
that constitute crimes against humanity, the prosecutor must show that the charged
acts took place as part of a widespread or systematic commission of similar acts.
The purpose of the "attack" requirement is to prevent single, random, or limited
acts from being categorized as crimes against humanity. 166 While the underlying
acts that can constitute the attack are often carried out through violence, the attack
does not have to be violent1 67 and may involve other inhumane mistreatment of the
civilian population. 168
The ICTY and the SCSL adopt a somewhat different approach but ultimately
arrive at a similar result. They have held that an attack is different from an armed
conflict and that, while an attack may take place during an armed conflict, it need
not be part of the armed conflict. 169 As a result, the attack "is not limited to the use
Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 148 (Dec. 5 2003).
164. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, at 1 102; Blagojevit & Joki5, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at
548; Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, 138; Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 148; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac,
Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 1 59; see also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 71, art. 7(2)
(noting that the Rome Statute "should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack").
165. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(2) (describing an attack as a "course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [of Article 7]"); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 581, (Sept. 2, 1998) ("The concept of 'attack' may be defined as a [sic]
unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (I) of the Statute, like murder, extermination,
enslavement, etc."); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 1 70 (Dec. 6, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment,
205 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 1 327 (May 15, 2003).
166. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1579; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
194 (Nov. 30, 2005) ("It has been emphasised, repeatedly, that the contextual element required for the
application of Article 5 serves to exclude single, random or limited acts from the domain of crimes
against humanity."); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 1 215 (June 10, 2007)
("Proof that the attack occurred either on a widespread basis or in a systematic manner is sufficient to
exclude isolated or random acts."). See also Ford, supra note 152, at 157-58 (noting that the
International Law Commission debated removing the contextual requirements from the definition of
crimes against humanity during the 1950s but ultimately decided that some sort of contextual
requirement was necessary to prevent too many ordinary domestic crimes from being treated as crimes
against humanity).
167. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 581 (noting that apartheid is a crime against humanity and
imposing such a system can constitute an attack, even if done without violence); Rutaganda, Case No.
ICTR-96-3-T, 170; Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 1205.
168. Senanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, 327.
169. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, T 86; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 1 182; Brima, Case No
SCSL-04-16-T, 1 214; Prosecutor v. Fofana & Konewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 111
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of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population." 170 A
line of ICTY cases suggests that an attack is a "course of conduct involving the
commission of acts of violence,"171 but this line of cases implicitly accepts that the
attack can be broader than just violence because the decisions always note that the
attack is not limited to the use of armed force and also includes any mistreatment
of the civilian population. 172 Thus the ICTY and the SCSL agree that any
mistreatment of the civilian population can constitute an attack if it is widespread
or systematic.
The definition adopted by the ICTY and SCSL - any mistreatment of the
civilian population - is arguably broader than the definition used by the ICTR and
ICC because the concept of mistreatment might well cover acts that could not be
the underlying crimes. The broadest of the underlying crimes, other inhumane
acts, still requires severe mental or physical suffering or a serious attack on human
dignity. Mistreatment generally means "to treat badly," 173 which does not seem to
require severe suffering. Consequently, the definition of attack used by the SCSL
and the ICTY may be broader than that used by the ICTR and ICC. However, it
seems possible that if the ICTY or SCSL were forced to define mistreatment that
they would conclude that it involves the commission of other inhumane acts. 174
No matter which definition one uses, the denial of aid to the survivors of
Cyclone Nargis did constitute an attack. As noted above, in May 2008 there was
reason to believe that the government's actions in refusing aid, limiting the amount
of aid, and controlling how that aid was distributed constituted murder,

(Aug. 2, 2007).
170. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, 86; see also Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgment, T 623 (July 31, 2003); Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 1 214; Fofana & Konewa, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T, 111.
171. Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 543 (Jan. 17, 2005);
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, T 182; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 131
(Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, T 141 (Dec. 5, 2003).
172. Blagojevit & Jokit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, T 543; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 182; Brdanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, 1 131; Gali, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 1 141.
There are forms of mistreatment of the civilian population that do not necessarily involve violence, like
deprivation of food, water, shelter and medical care, which suggests there is an inherent inconsistency
between the statement that an attack involves acts of violence and the recognition that mistreatment of
the civilian population can also constitute an attack. The emphasis on violence appears to be a result of
the fact that the ICTY requires that crimes against humanity take place in connection with an armed
conflict. See ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 5. This requirement is unique to the ICTY and does not
form a part of the modem customary international law definition of crimes against humanity. See supra
notes 152-58 and accompanying text. The ICTY is thus in the odd position of requiring two
jurisdictional elements: an attack and an armed conflict. Consequently, all of the crimes against
humanity cases that have come before the ICTY have also involved an armed conflict. This appears to
have led to the line of cases that suggests that an attack involves acts of violence.
173. See Oxford American Dictionaryand Thesaurus 957 (2003).
174. For example, a Trial Chamber at the ICTR suggested that mistreatment might have to be
inhumane when it said that an attack "could also involve other forms of inhumane mistreatment of the
civilian population." Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 1 327 (May 15,
2003).
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extermination, and other inhumane acts. 7 These actions could constitute both a
course of conduct involving the commission of the underlying acts of a crime
against humanity and the mistreatment of the civilian population of the Irrawaddy
Delta.
2. Widespread and Systematic
The attack was probably both widespread and systematic. It was widespread
because it was large-scale and it affected a large number of people. 176 According
to a report prepared by the United Nations and the government of Myanmar, more
than 2.4 million people throughout the Irrawaddy Delta were severely affected by
the cyclone.17 7 75 percent of them did not receive any aid within the first three
weeks of the crisis.178
This means that approximately 1.8 million people
throughout the Irrawaddy Delta were victims of the attack. Given the information
that was available to the international community in May 2008, there was probably
sufficient information to conclude that there was a widespread attack. 17 9
The contextual element would also be present if the attack was systematic.
There is evidence that the attack was systematic because it consisted of an
organized pattern of non-accidental repetition of criminal conduct.18 0
The
underlying crimes - denial of food, water, shelter, and medical care - occurred
repeatedly throughout the Irrawaddy Delta and were the result of a deliberate
policy of denying aid to the victims. This policy emanated from the highest levels
of the Myanmar government and was systematically enforced by officials of that
government at all levels.
3. Directed Against a Civilian Population
There is little doubt that the attack was directed against a civilian
population."' Many crimes against humanity occur in the context of armed
conflicts, and the definition of civilian is geared towards distinguishing between
civilians and combatants during an armed conflict. In general, a civilian is any
person who is not taking an active part in hostilities, even including members of
the armed forces if they are hors de combat.18 2 In the case of Cyclone Nargis,
175. See supra Section II(B)(4).
176. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, T 94 (Dec. 17, 2004);
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 183; Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 545.
177. See supra note 2.
178. See supra note 27.
179. Courts have previously found that attacks on much smaller groups are widespread. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, I 1, 37, 61, 482 (Aug. 2, 2001) (concluding that
the attack on the Srebrenica safe area, which held approximately 40,000 Bosnian Muslims, was a
widespread and systematic attack).
180. Kordi & cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, T 94; Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A,
Judgment, T 101 (July 29, 2004); Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, T 183.
181. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, T 185 ("The attack must be directed against a civilian
population."); Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, T 143 (Dec. 5, 2003).
182. Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 544 (Jan. 17, 2005)
("The term 'civilian' refers to persons not taking part in hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds detention or any
other cause.").
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there was no armed conflict going on in the Irrawaddy Delta and no suggestions
that there were any people who could be called combatants among the victims.
Consequently, there is little doubt that the victims should be considered almost
entirely civilians. The attack was directed against the civilian population of the
18
Irrawaddy Delta because the survivors were the primary object of the attack.s
As
noted above, the government committed the acts that constitute the attack knowing
that it was probable they would result in the commission of crimes and also
knowing that the victims would be almost entirely civilian. There seems to be
little doubt that the attack was directed against a civilian population.
4. Natural Disasters as Per Se Attacks
The author had originally intended to argue that Cyclone Nargis was a per se
attack on a civilian population, and that natural disasters that resulted in large scale
losses of life should always be "attacks" for purposes of determining whether a
crime against humanity had been committed. However, the author has concluded
that treating natural disasters as per se attacks is both unnecessary and bad policy.
As demonstrated above, the existing definition of crimes against humanity is
sufficient to cope with the consequences of Cyclone Nargis. Although the cyclone
itself is not treated as an attack, the consequences of the government's disastrous
policy of refusing aid can be considered an attack. Thus, crimes against humanity
extends to cover the suffering that the international community was most
concerned about - that which resulted from the government's refusal to allow aid
into the Irrawaddy Delta. Given that the existing understanding of crimes against
humanity is flexible enough to be applied to the consequences of a natural disaster,
there seems to be little need for a broader definition of an attack. If the traditional

definition of an attack had been incapable of accommodating the terrible manmade consequences of Cyclone Nargis, a much stronger argument could be made
that the definition should be expanded.
Moreover, it would be bad policy to extend the definition of attack to
encompass all natural disasters that result in large scale loss of life. By focusing
on a definition of attack that depends on the commission of a widespread or
systematic pattern of crimes, the existing definition ensures that crimes against
humanity will only be applied in situations of sufficient gravity. If every natural
disaster was an attack, then many ordinary and unrelated crimes that occurred in
conjunction with natural disasters would constitute crimes against humanity. This
would vitiate one of the main purposes of the jurisdictional element, which is to
prevent random, single, or isolated acts of violence from being treated as crimes
against humanity. 184 For these reasons, the author is convinced that the existing
definition of the attack is adequate and does not need to be expanded.

183. Blaikit, Case No. IT-95-14-A, T 106; Kordi & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, T 96;
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, 191 (June 12, 2002).
184. See supranote 164.
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5. The Junta's Awareness of the Attack
One final element of a crime against humanity is the perpetrator's knowledge.
The perpetrator must be aware that the attack is occurring and that his or her
criminal acts constitute a part of the attack. 85 In this case, at least for the leaders
of the military government of Myanmar, it seems almost certain that they knew
about the attack. The denial of aid resulted in a lots of news coverage and a huge
amount of political pressure on the government to admit aid. 18 6 It would be
difficult for the leaders of the Myanmar government to claim that they were
unaware of the crisis and its effect on the civilian population of the Irrawaddy
Delta. In addition, the alleged criminal acts that give rise to the underlying crimes
- the denial of aid - are the exact same acts that give rise to the attack, and it has
already been shown that the government must have been aware of the attack.
Consequently, the leaders must have been aware that their acts were part of the
attack.
6. Conclusion
The preceding sections have demonstrated that there was reason to believe
that all of the elements of a crime against humanity were present in Myanmar in
the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. There was a widespread and
systematic attack on a civilian population, and the Myanmar government was
aware of this attack. There is also reason to believe that crimes were being
committed, including murder, extermination, and inhumane acts. In short, there
was reason to believe that the Myanmar government's response to Cyclone Nargis
constituted a crime against humanity. But what should the international
community have done about it? Could it have invoked the responsibility to
protect? If so, what actions could or should have been taken to protect the
population of the Irrawaddy Delta?
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The responsibility to protect doctrine was initially developed by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in an
attempt to lay the foundation for an international consensus on the legality of
humanitarian interventions 1 7 at a time when the legality and legitimacy of such

185. See supranote 149.
186. See supra Section I.
187. See

INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON INTERVENTION

AND

STATE SOVEREIGNTY,

THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1-2 (International Development Research Centre 2001), available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Conmmission-Report.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT].

The ICISS was a response to a call by Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the international community to
reach agreement about how to balance state sovereignty against humanitarian concerns during so-called
"humanitarian interventions." Id. at 2. As the report notes, the international community was criticized
both when it did intervene (Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia) and when it did not intervene (Rwanda). Id.
at 1. The Secretary-General identified the need for common agreement on a set of principles that would
guide the international community in deciding when humanitarian intervention would be appropriate.
Id. at 1-3. Gareth Evans provides a useful overview of the development of the responsibility to protect
doctrine. See Evans, supranote 36, at 707-08.
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interventions was a very contentious issue.188 The ICISS's major innovation was
reframing the debate from one about the right of states to intervene, which was
controversial, to one about the obligation of states to protect their own citizens,
which enjoyed far broader acceptance. 189 Thus, the ICISS concluded that the
primary responsibility to protect populations lies with the concerned state. 190
However, where a population is "suffering serious harm" as a result of war,
insurgency, repression, or state failure, and the concerned state is "unwilling or
unable" to prevent that harm, the "principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect."1 91 Although the ICISS acknowledged that
military intervention to protect populations would be an "exceptional and
extraordinary measure," it nevertheless identified situations where such
intervention would be appropriate, including large-scale loss of life and large-scale
ethnic cleansing. 192 The ICISS stressed that intervention would be a last resort1 93
and that it "should" be authorized by the United Nations Security Council. 194
The ICISS equivocated on the key question of whether humanitarian
interventions would be legal in the absence of Security Council authorization. 195
This was a very important issue that had been highlighted by NATO intervention
in Kosovo in 1999 despite the lack of Security Council authorization. 196 The
Kosovo intervention had subsequently been described by the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo as "legitimate, but not legal."1 97 The ICISS
noted that "[t]here is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations
Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes"
and stressed that Security Council authorization "should in all cases" be sought
before any military intervention occurred. 198 Although nothing in the "principles"
formulated by the ICISS expressly states that some humanitarian interventions
might be legal in the absence of Security Council authorization, the use of
"should" rather than "must" indicates that Security Council authorization may not
be mandatory. Similarly, the ICISS rather obliquely suggested that if the Security
Council does not authorize a legitimate request for humanitarian intervention,

188. See Joyner, supranote 52, at 698-700 (describing the acute failures of and bitter disputes over
humanitarian intervention during the 1990s).
189. See Evans, supra note 36, at 708; Max W. Matthews, Tracking the Emergence of a New
InternationalNorm: The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 137, 140-41 (2008).
190. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XI. See also Joyner, supra note 52,
at 708.
191. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XI.
192. Id. at XII.
193. Id. at XII ("Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored . . . .").
194. Id. at XII ("Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military
intervention being carried out.").
195. See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,
101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 99-100, 104 (2007).
196. See Evans, supranote 36, at 711-12.
197. See Evans, supranote 36, at 707.
198. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XII.
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"concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency"
of the situation. 199
In the substance of the report, the ICISS addresses this question in slightly
more detail. Although the text once again stresses the desirability of prior Security
Council authorization, it also suggests several alternatives. One suggestion is that
a General Assembly resolution in favor of intervention "if supported by an
overwhelming majority of member states, would provide a high degree of
legitimacy for an intervention." 200 This is essentially a suggestion that the General
Assembly ratify unilateral interventions as a way to provide political cover for
states that intend to act without Security Council authorization. Next the report
suggests that action could be taken by a concerned regional organization with the
Security Council authorizing the intervention after the fact. 20 1 There is some
precedent for this approach. For example, the Security Council authorized the
intervention in Sierra Leone by ECOWAS forces after the fact.202 Finally, the
report avoids offering an opinion on whether a state can intervene unilaterally and
simply asks which would be worse, a unilateral intervention which may or may not
be legal or allowing large numbers of people to die because the Security Council is
unable to act. 203
The concept of the responsibility to protect went through several iterationS204
before a narrower version was unanimously adopted by the United Nations at the
2005 World Summit.2 05 The language of the responsibility to protect has
subsequently been used by the Security Council206 and one of the co-founders of
the doctrine suggests that it is now a "broadly accepted international norm."207
The heads of states and governments present at the Summit acknowledged that

199. Id. at XIII. This is probably a reference to NATO's intervention in Kosovo. See Evans, supra
note 36, at 711-12 (describing the situation in Kosovo as a "clear case" for the application of the
responsibility to protect that was blocked by the threat of a Russian veto in the Security Council).
200. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at 53.
201. Id. at 54.
202. See generally Lee F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention
Doctrine: The ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 605, 622-23
(2001).
203. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at 55.

204. See Evans, supra note 36, at 713-14 (describing the appearance of the responsibility to protect
doctrine in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 and again in
the Secretary-General's 2005 report entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, which served as the basic working document for the 2005 World Summit);
Stahn, supra note 195, at 99-101, 105.
205. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45. Stahn discusses the debates that
occurred prior to the World Summit about the inclusion of the responsibility to protect. See Stahn,
supranote 195, at 108.
206. See Matthews, supra note 189, at 148-50 (arguing that the Security Council implemented
some aspects of the responsibility to protect in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur); Stahn,
supranote 195, at 100.
207. Evans, supra note 36, at 715. But see Matthews, supra note 189, at 147-48 (arguing that the
responsibility to protect is on its way to becoming a binding international norm but that it has not
reached that stage yet); Staln, supranote 195, at 110-116 (arguing that while parts of the responsibility
to protect rest on traditional legal concepts, other parts are radical and largely unaccepted).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

264

VOL. 3 8:2

"[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 208 and crimes against humanity. 209 This is
a narrower understanding of the responsibility to protect than that articulated by
the ICISS because the responsibility only arises in response to specific crimes,
rather than to large-scale human suffering.210 While it is certainly true that the four
crimes listed are often accompanied by large-scale human suffering, it is not true
that every case of humanitarian disaster constitutes one of the enumerated crimes.
Consequently, the inclusion of the enumerated crimes limited the application of the
responsibility to protect during humanitarian disasters.
The UN's articulation of the responsibility to protect was also narrower than
the ICISS's proposal because it rejected the possibility that interventions could
occur without the approval of the Security Council. The document produced by
the World Summit noted that the international community also has the
responsibility to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity, but stressed that the duty would be
implemented "through the United Nations." 211 The international community also
indicated that it was prepared to take collective action, but only "through the
Security Council, in accordance with the [United Nations] Charter, including
Chapter VII." 2 12 This is a rejection of the possibility that states could unilaterally
act to enforce the responsibility to protect.213
The use of international crimes as the trigger for the responsibility to protect
was probably intended to limit its application. However, it might have had an
unintended consequence. The broader criteria proposed by the ICISS were vague
and political.

concept.

The idea of a large scale loss of life is not an inherently legal

This would have left the international community with considerable

208. The inclusion of ethnic cleansing in the list of crimes that can trigger the responsibility to
protect doctrine is somewhat odd. While ethnic cleansing was a hallmark of the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, it is not generally considered a separate crime under international law. Rather, it is a series
of physical acts that can constitute different crimes, depending on the circumstances under which they
are committed. Forcible deportations or transfers of protected persons are prohibited as grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Similarly, deportations or forcible
transfers of populations can be a crime against humanity. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 5(d); Rome
Statute, supra note 47, 7(d); ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 3(d). No international tribunal has
jurisdiction over ethnic cleansing as a separate crime, although its inclusion in the World Summit
Outcome Document may be the first step on its journey to becoming a separate crime. 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, supranote 45,
138-39.
209. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, TT 138-39.
210. The ICISS had proposed that the threshold for military intervention be either large scale ethnic
cleansing or "large scale loss of life." RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supranote 187, at XII.
211. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, T 139.
212. Id. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter governs the use of coercive force. In particular,
Article 42 gives the Security Council the power to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore
international peace and security. See U.N. Charter art. 42; Joyner, supra note 52, at 701-02 (describing
the operation of Chapter VII of the Charter).
213. But see Stahn, supra note 195, at 109 (indicating that some states took the position that the
Outcome Document did not preclude humanitarian interventions in the absence of Security Council
authorization).
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discretion when invoking the responsibility. The use of explicit crimes as triggers
may have narrowed the scope of the doctrine's application, but it made its
application turn on an inherently legal concept. There are well-established legal
rules that are applied regularly by international courts to determine whether a
particular situation is a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide. 214 This
has effectively removed some of the political "wiggle room" and may ultimately
serve to constrain the actions of the international community. One important
consequence is that international criminal law experts can now make reasoned
arguments about when the criteria for the application of the responsibility to
protect are present.
A. Applying the Responsibility to Protectto the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis
"Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes ...
Once there is reason to
believe that a crime against humanity is occurring, the first duty falls on the state in
which the crime is occurring to protect its own population by preventing the
commission of the crimes. The international community is supposed to encourage
and help states exercise this responsibility. 216
This paradigm works in cases where the government is not at fault for the
situation that leads to the invocation of the responsibility to protect, but is less
effective in situations where a state itself is committing the triggering acts. It
seems futile to rely on the state to prevent crimes that it is committing, and
encouragement by the international community is unlikely to be of much use
either. Indeed, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, there was reason to believe that
the crimes against humanity were being committed by the state against its own
population.
Nevertheless, despite immense political pressure from the
international community, the government persisted in refusing aid in the weeks
immediately after the cyclone.
When the state fails in its responsibility to protect, the burden shifts to the
international community. The 2005 World Outcome document indicates that the
international community should first try to use "diplomatic, humanitarian and
peaceful means" to help protect the targeted population.2 17 The international
community did this. A humanitarian response was organized quickly by the
United Nations, and both the United Nations and many of the individual member
states used diplomatic means to try and convince the Myanmar government to
accept the humanitarian aid.2 18 However, these methods were initially unable to
overcome the Myanmar government's intransigence.

214. See, e.g., supra Sections II(B) and II(C).
215. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, T 138.
216. Id.
217. Id. T 139 (noting that the international community will use "appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means" to protect populations at risk).
218. See supra Section I.
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When peaceful means are "inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations," the international community has committed
itself to "tak[ing] collective action, in a timely and decisive manner," including use
of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 219 The aftermath of Cyclone Nargis
appears to be the sort of situation that the member states of the United Nations had
in mind when they signed the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and agreed
to the responsibility to protect. Peaceful means had proven to be inadequate, the
Myanmar government was manifestly failing to protect the cyclone survivors, and
it appeared that the lives of millions of survivors were at risk. Yet the Security
Council was unable to act. Some Western states discussed the introduction of a
Security Council resolution that would compel Myanmar to accept the
humanitarian aid, but it was clear that China would veto any Chapter VII
resolution.220
This left the international community in exactly the situation that the
responsibility to protect was supposed to avoid. A crime against humanity was
apparently occurring, a civilian population was being harmed, and the government
was manifestly unwilling to prevent it; however, the international community did
nothing because the Security Council was paralyzed by the threat of a Permanent
Member veto. 22 1 According to the version of the responsibility to protect adopted
by the United Nations, this effectively ends all chance of coercive action. The
World Summit Outcome Document does not contemplate any fallback position if
peaceful means are inadequate and the Security Council fails to act.
The only option remaining would be for a state or group of states to intervene
unilaterally without Security Council authorization, one of the things that the
codification of the responsibility to protect was meant to prevent. But as the ICISS
noted, "where lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the
Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are
slaughtered while the Security Council stands by."222 This is an implicit
suggestion that, in some cases, the consequences of a unilateral humanitarian
intervention would be a lesser evil than doing nothing. However, in the aftermath
of Cyclone Nargis, no state was willing to engage in unilateral intervention, even
though several countries had military forces in position, 22 3 and the intervention
probably could have been done while limiting the scope of any direct conflict with
the Myanmar military.224
219. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, T 139.
220. See supranote 39.
221. This outcome is not surprising. As the ICISS noted when it first proposed the responsibility to
protect, "[m]any of our interlocutors regarded capricious use of the veto, or threat of its use, as likely to
be the principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick and decisive action is
needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis." RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra
note 187, at 51. See also Evans, supra note 36, at 716 (noting the potential for Security Council
paralysis); Joyner, supranote 52, at 715.
222. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at 55.
223. See supranote 16.
224. Although some commentators raised the specter of Western militaries fighting their way into
Myanmar, it is unlikely there would have been much direct confrontation. See Thakur, supra note 41
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Three factors seemed to prevent such intervention. First, if there had been a
unilateral intervention, the Myanmar government would probably have terminated
the United Nations-run relief effort. While the relief effort was only reaching a
small percentage of the population of the Irrawaddy Delta, that small percentage
still represented hundreds of thousands of people. Those people would probably
have stopped receiving aid.
Intervention might actually have made the
humanitarian situation worse. Second, it is not clear how effective a unilateral
intervention would have been. At most, it would have involved dropping off relief
supplies by helicopter or boat. It is unlikely that any of the countries with military
forces in position would have established a permanent presence in the Irrawaddy
Delta because of the risk of armed conflict with the Myanmar military. 225
However, it was not clear how much aid could actually have been delivered
without the cooperation of the Myanmar government, nor was it clear how the aid
could be coordinated if the Myanmar government expelled all of the United
Nations staff members who were managing the U.N. aid effort. 226 Finally, there
was a lack of political will on the part of the United States, Great Britain, and
France.227
The decision not to intervene unilaterally may well have been the correct one
under the circumstances because of the risk that the hundreds of thousands of
people receiving aid through the UN-run relief effort would actually have been
228
worse off if that aid was cut off following an intervention.
It is possible, but by
no means guaranteed, that some sort of intervention would have taken place if the
Myanmar government had been blocking all aid. At that point, there would have
been little downside to bringing in relief supplies by helicopter from the waiting
US, French, and British ships, particularly if the risk of confrontation with the
Myanmar military could be minimized. However, the Myanmar government let in
just enough aid to make risking the interruption of that aid during a unilateral
intervention too risky.
(suggesting that Bernard Kouchner was advocating "Western soldiers fighting in the jungles of
Southeast Asia again."). Given the geography of the Irrawaddy Delta, much of the area was
inaccessible except with helicopters. See supra note 9. Thus, it seems likely that those nations with
military forces in the area, like Great Britain, France and the United States, could have delivered
humanitarian aid to the Irrawaddy Delta while largely avoiding confrontations with Myanmar forces.
225. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 41 (noting that "an enormous amount of assistance can be
provided while maintaining a small footprint on shore, greatly reducing the chances of a clash with the
Burmese armed forces").
226. See Evans, supra note 41 (noting that efforts to drop relief supplies by helicopter would
probably be "hopelessly inefficient").
227. The problem of lack of political will always be an obstacle to taking decisive action, including
non-military action, in support of the responsibility to protect. See Evans, supra note 36, at 720-2 1;
Joyner, supra note 52, at 721-22 (discussing ways to build political will).
228. As the ICISS and others have argued, no implementation of the responsibility to protect
should make the situation worse. Any state or group of states considering military intervention should
always ask whether the consequences of the intervention are likely to be worse than the consequences
of inaction. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XII; Evans, supranote 36, at

711, 719; Joyner, supra note 52, at 714-15 ("Armed intervention cannot be justified if ... the action
appears likely to produce adverse consequences or suffering greater than if there were no intervention at
all.").
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B. Successes and Failuresofthe Responsibility to Protect
Ultimately, the responsibility to protect did not live up to its primary goal of
saving lives during a crisis. In this sense, the responsibility to protect was a
failure. Nor has it been the only failure of the responsibility to protect since the
doctrine was adopted by the United Nations in 2005.229 Nevertheless, there is
some reason for hope for the future. The Security Council has begun adopting the
language of the responsibility to protect and will, hopefully, continue to use it as a
guide for its actions in the future. In addition, the use of international crimes to
trigger the application of the responsibility to protect creates an opening for
international criminal law experts to make reasoned legal arguments about when
the responsibility to protect should be used. This may lead to a more systematic
application of the principle in the future.
The situation in Myanmar exposed a weakness in the responsibility to protect
created by the international community's desire not to make the situation worse by
intervening. Unscrupulous states could manipulate the severity of the crisis as a
way to prevent coercive intervention. Although the author has found no
suggestion that Myanmar deliberately calibrated the amount of aid it was willing to
accept in order to make sure that the benefits of intervention were outweighed by
the risk that Myanmar would terminate the UN-led aid effort, this possibility
exists. States that are responsible for creating the situations that necessitate the
application of the responsibility to protect may be able to game the system by
finely calibrating the scope of the violence or by creating a situation that ensures
The international
that the intervention would make the situation worse.
community must be alert to this possibility and act decisively against states that try

to manipulate the system.
Moreover, the situation in Myanmar also highlighted a known weakness in
the reliance on the Security Council to take action to prevent the commission of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The Security
Council is an inherently political body and there is no guarantee that it will act,
even if a legal basis exists. However, the Security Council's failure to act gives
new impetus to the concept of humanitarian intervention. While no country was
willing to intervene unilaterally in Myanmar, when tens or hundreds of thousands
of people are dying, there is certain to be public pressure for some countries to act.
If one of the Permanent Members uses a veto or threat of veto to paralyze the
Security Council, it increases the likelihood that one or more states will act
unilaterally.
The only way to truly eliminate the need for unilateral humanitarian
intervention would be for the Security Council to act in every situation where the
legal basis for acting exists. Until such time as the Permanent Members accept
some limitations on the use of the veto power, the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is likely to persist. An agreement on the limitation of vetoes does not
229. While the United Nations used some of the mechanisms of the responsibility to protect in
responding to the crisis in Darfur, ultimately the Security Council was unwilling to authorize coercive
military action and the crisis continued unabated. See Matthews, supranote 189, at 148-150.
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appear likely soon.230 Consequently, in the short term, there are likely to be
situations where such interventions occur and are considered legitimate, even if not
everyone agrees they are legal.231
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CRiME AGAINST HUMANITY
The existence of crimes against humanity is not simply a predicate for the
invocation of the responsibility to protect. They are international crimes in their
own right, for which individuals can be held criminally liable. If the Security
Council were to invoke the responsibility to protect to authorize coercive action
during a future crisis, this would act as a finding that one of the triggering crimes
was occurring. What consequences would flow from this finding? Does the
invocation of the responsibility to protect doctrine impose on the Security Council
an obligation to find some way to investigate and prosecute the "crimes" that form
the basis for the Security Council's action? Are there other entities that could
initiate investigations, either with or without Security Council approval?
This section will examine the possible consequences of a determination that
there is reason to believe that crimes against humanity were committed. It will
discuss the possible venues for any trials, including the possibility of creating a
new hybrid tribunal for Myanmar. It will also briefly discuss the proposed scope
of such a hybrid tribunal.
A. Possible Venues for Trials
As noted above, there is reason to believe that crimes against humanity were
committed in Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.232 This reason to
believe is sufficient to initiate a criminal investigation at any of the international
criminal tribunals.233 One implication of the linking of the responsibility to protect
doctrine and international criminal law is that any resolution by the Security
Council that invokes the responsibility to protect to justify coercive action
constitutes a finding that sufficient evidence exists to initiate a criminal
investigation of the acts that triggered the resolution. But this raises the question:
who could or would investigate these alleged crimes? Usually, when crimes are
committed, the state where the crimes occurred has the first claim on prosecuting
them.234 The government of Myanmar could initiate investigations and prosecute
people. However, it is extremely unlikely that the present government of
Myanmar will investigate because the evidence suggests that senior members of
the government are the individuals most likely to be investigated.
230. See Evans, supra note 36, at 716-17 (noting that the reference to criteria for when intervention
was appropriate was removed from the World Summit Outcome Document in part because certain
members of the Security Council did not want any constraints on their decision-making).
231. See supranotes 195-199.
232. See supra Section II(C)(6).
233. See supra notes 53-57 (discussing the threshold necessary to initiate an investigation). The
threshold this article has used to determine whether the responsibility to protect should be invoked is a
higher threshold than any of the international courts use to initiate an investigation.
234. See KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 38 (2001) ("Jurisdiction
over criminal matters is primarily territorial."); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 712-13 (2003).
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There is universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, 235 which means
that theoretically any country could investigate and possibly try the leaders of the
Myanmar government for their actions in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.
However, there are significant practical limitations on the application of universal
jurisdiction. Some countries, including Belgium, have attempted to implement
universal jurisdiction,236 but this has not been a smooth process.237 In practice, few
countries have attempted to charge people with international crimes that are
unrelated to the country in which the person is being charged.238 In addition, there
is always a problem obtaining the suspects. Most countries are reluctant to enforce
arrest warrants directed against heads of state or senior government officials.239
Obtaining the necessary evidence for a formal investigation would also be
extremely challenging.240 Consequently, universal jurisdiction seems an unlikely
mechanism to investigate the leaders of the Myanmar government.
The next possibility is an international court of some kind. The ICTY, SCSL,
ICTR and ECCC are all limited in their jurisdiction and could not exercise
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar. 24 1 The ICC is a possibility
because the crimes were committed after the Rome Statute entered into force.242
However, Myanmar is not currently a member of the Assembly of States Parties,243
which means that the ICC could only obtain jurisdiction over the alleged crimes if
the Security Council referred the matter to the ICC244 or Myanmar voluntarily
245
Neither is likely to happen. The
accepted ICC jurisdiction over the crimes.
Security Council could not pass a resolution ordering the Myanmar government to
accept humanitarian aid because of the threat of a Chinese veto, and it seems
unlikely that the Security Council would agree to conferring jurisdiction on the

235. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 234, at 39.
236. See id. at 62, n.72 (discussing Belgium's attempts to use universal jurisdiction to try "grave
violations of international humanitarian law" irrespective of whether Belgium has any direct connection
to the crimes); BASSIOUNI, supranote 234, at 713 n.158.
237. See generally Malvina Halberstam, Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law: Vindication of
InternationalJustice or Pursuit of Politics?, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 247 (2003) (describing Belgium's
difficulties in attempting to implement universal jurisdiction in the face of charges that the process was
being abused to bring politically-motivated charges against heads of state).
238. Usually, countries only exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed in another
country if nationals of the prosecuting country were victims of the crime, the crime was carried out by
nationals of the prosecuting country or it affects the security of the prosecuting state. KITTICHAISAREE,
supranote 234, at 39.
239. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 234, at 39-41 (discussing the many difficulties in obtaining
custody over the accused); see also id. at 62 n.72 (noting that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
filed a request before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) asking the ICJ to discharge a Belgium
arrest warrant for the arrest of the DRC's Minister for Foreign Affairs).
240. See supranote 64.
241. See ECCC Law, supra note 47, art. 2; ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 1; SCSL Statute, supra
note 47, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supranote 47, art. 1.
242. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 11(1).
243. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supranote 158 (listing the current States Parties to
the Rome Statute).
244. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 13(b).
245. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 12(3).
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ICC. It seems just as unlikely that the current Myanmar government would
voluntarily agree to ICC jurisdiction. Moreover, the ICC appears to have reached
the limits of its capacity with the criminal investigations it already has
underway.246 It does not seem to have the capacity to take on the situation in
Myanmar in the near future.
However, even if there is little likelihood that the ICC will investigate the
situation in Myanmar, the responsibility to protect doctrine still has important
implications for the ICC. If the Security Council were to use the responsibility to
protect doctrine to authorize coercive action, it could and should simultaneously
refer the situation to the ICC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. Of course,
there is no way to compel the Security Council to refer a situation to the ICC.
Nevertheless, if it has made a finding that one of the triggering crimes for the
responsibility to protect is occurring it has at least a moral obligation to also refer
that matter to the ICC for investigation.
The analysis is a little different if the situation that is the subject of a Security
Council resolution invoking the responsibility to protect doctrine is taking place on
the territory of an ICC member state. In that case, the Security Council resolution
should be viewed as primafacie evidence that the Prosecutor should initiate an
investigation on his or her own authority under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. It
would also probably constitute primafacie evidence that Article 17 of the Rome
Statute is satisfied and that the target of the resolution is unable or unwilling to
genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution of the matter on its own.
Finally, there is the possibility of creating a new ad hoc international tribunal
or hybrid tribunal 247 to investigate serious violations of international law in
Myanmar. A new ad hoc tribunal is unlikely. The ICTY and ICTR have proved to
be extremely expensive and very slow, and there appears to be little appetite in the
international community to create new ad hoc tribunals.248 Hybrid tribunals will
probably be preferred going forward because they are perceived as being cheaper
and quicker than fully international tribunals, while still meeting international
standards. 249 A hybrid tribunal could only be created in Myanmar with the

246. The ICC only has the capacity for three simultaneous investigations and two or three trials per
year. See William W. Burke-White, ProactiveComplementarity: The InternationalCriminal Courtand
NationalCourts in the Rome System ofInternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J., 53, 54, 66-67 (2008);
see also Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 303, 308 (2003)
(predicting that the ICC would be able to try only a "handful" of the most egregious cases and that the
number of possible cases was likely to "far outstrip" the ICC's ability to try them).
247. Hybrid tribunals combine elements of national and international courts in their structure,
procedural rules and subject matter jurisdiction. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 297-300. The bestknown examples of hybrid tribunals are the SCSL and the ECCC, although courts that have combined
some national and international elements have also taken place in Kosovo and East Timor. See id. at
296-301.
248. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 303 (noting that "calls for a [fully] international court in
Sierra Leone were resisted because such a tribunal would be too expensive and time-consuming to
create.").
249. See Suzannah Linton, New Approaches to InternationalJustice in Cambodia and East Timor,
84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 93, 113 n.845 (2002) (noting that hybrid tribunals have the potential
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cooperation of the Myanmar government. It would be staffed by a mix of
international and national staff and would probably be largely funded by the
international community. It would likely have subject matter jurisdiction over
violations of international law plus any violations of domestic law that seem
appropriate.250 Like all of the suggestions discussed previously, this is unlikely to
happen while the current government is in power.
The obvious drawback to all of these proposals is that they require the
cooperation of the Myanmar government, and the current government is unlikely
to cooperate with any investigation of its own activities. Consequently, any
prosecutions for crimes against humanity are not likely to occur until there is a
change in the government of Myanmar. The current regime is not particularly
popular, and the last time there was an election the people voted overwhelmingly
in favor of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, which won
the 1990 election by a "landslide." 25 1 Therefore, it seems possible that a regime
change will occur at some point in the future. There is no statute of limitations for
crimes against humanity, 25 2 so the international community and the people of
Myanmar could wait until a more accountable government comes to power.
B. The Scope of a Hybrid Tribunalfor Myanmar
Of the venues discussed above, a new hybrid tribunal seems to be the most
likely location where investigations and trials could take place, although it would
still depend on some sort of regime change in Myanmar. Apart from being quicker
and cheaper than fully international courts like the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, 253
hybrid tribunals are also thought to: (1) be perceived as more legitimate by the
local population than either distant international courts, which usually have their
headquarters and trials far away from where the atrocities occurred, or discredited
domestic courts, which may well have been complicit in the atrocities; (2) offer
useful opportunities for capacity-building for local legal staff, including judges,
to be more cost-effective and expeditious than ad hoc international tribunals while operating in
accordance
with
international
human
rights
standards),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/3e02cd6224ce0af6012568b20048a62f/7b6428d7e40dd0d3c1
256ba7003477ce/SFILE/093-120 Linton.pdf; but see Sarah Williams, The Cambodian Extraordinary
Chambers - A Dangerous Precedentfor InternationalJustice?, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 227, 243-44
(2004) (discussing the difficulties that hybrid tribunals have in meeting international standards).
250. See ECCC Law, supra note 47, arts. 3-8 (giving the ECCC jurisdiction over certain violations
of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code and various international crimes); SCSL Statute, supranote 47, at
arts. 2-5 (giving the SCSL jurisdiction over certain national and international crimes).
251. See Defeated Pro-GovernmentParty Calls Myanmar Elections a Fraud,L.A. TIMES, June 16,
1990, at A20; Opposition Claims Wide Lead in Myanmar Elections, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1990, at A7.
The military junta initially indicated that it would step down after losing the election. Myanmar Junta
Vows to Step Down, TORONTO STAR, May 29, 1990, at A13. However, later that year, the military
government "outlawed" the National League for Democracy. Party Outlawed, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada), Dec. 21, 1990. It has remained in power ever since.
252. See Ford, supra note 152, at 159-69 (describing the 1968 Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and the 1974
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes).
253. See supranote 249.
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lawyers, and court clerks; and (3) do a better job of embedding international legal
norms regarding mass atrocities in the local consciousness.254 These potential
benefits, combined with a lack of capacity at the ICC, suggest that a new hybrid
tribunal would be the best choice.
There are two issues related to the scope of a possible hybrid tribunal for
Myanmar that are worth considering: the tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction and
its personal jurisdiction. When the ICTY and the ICTR were created in the early
1990s, their personal jurisdiction was written quite broadly. They were given
jurisdiction over "persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law" that were committed in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda.255 However, the trend has been to narrow the jurisdiction of international
trials and focus on those senior leaders who are responsible for planning and
implementing large scale international crimes.256 This trend has carried over into
the jurisdiction of hybrid tribunals as well. The ECCC is limited to prosecuting
"senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible"
for the crimes, 25 7 while the competence of the SCSL is described as covering only
"persons who bear the greatest responsibility."258 Clearly, the trend is towards
prosecuting a narrower and narrower group of people and to focus on those most
responsible for the crimes. It is likely that this trend would be carried over into
any hybrid tribunal for Myanmar.259 Thus, the trials would likely focus on those
individuals who planned and implemented the Myanmar government's policy of
denying aid to its own population. Low-level perpetrators would probably not be
pursued.260
The tribunal's subject matter would obviously include the aftermath of
Cyclone Nargis, but there is no reason to limit it to only those crimes committed in
254. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 306-07; Helen Horsington, The Cambodian Khmer Rouge
Tribunal. The Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 462, at 480-82 (2004); Linton, supra
note 249, at 118 (noting that "[m]eaningful local involvement in the process is one of the potential
strengths of' hybrid tribunals); Williams, supra note 249, at 245.
255. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supranote 47, art. 1.
256. For example, the ICTY has been instructed to concentrate on the prosecution of "the most
senior leaders suspected of being most responsible" for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. See
S.C. Res. 1534,
5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (March 26, 2004); see S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). It now transfers cases that do not meet this criterion to national
jurisdictions. See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, Rule 11 (describing the
process for transferring cases to competent national courts).
257. ECCC Law, supranote 47, art. 2.
258. SCSL Statute, supra note 47, art. 1.
259. In 2003, Laura Dickinson suggested that hybrid tribunals might focus on low-level
perpetrators while the ICC would focus on high-level perpetrators. In practice it appears that the ICC
simply cannot handle even all the high-level perpetrators that could be referred to it, and that there
exists a niche for additional hybrid courts to supplement the limited capacity of the ICC. These new
hybrid courts are likely to focus on high-level perpetrators as well because all trials that comply with
international standards are expensive and time-consuming and it does not make sense to devote a hybrid
tribunal's limited resources to low-level perpetrators. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 309.
260. This also means that charges arising out of the alleged diversion of aid would probably not be
pursued unless it could be shown that they were part of a systematic policy of diverting aid. There is
some evidence this may have occurred, but it is not certain. See supraSection II(B)(3)(b).

274

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

connection with the cyclone. The Myanmar government has been accused of a
number of gross human rights violations in recent years that might constitute
violations of international criminal law, including the brutal crackdown on
Buddhist monks that occurred in September 2007.261 Since any new tribunal is
only likely to come into existence after the current Myanmar government is no
longer in power, the scope of any tribunal should be broad enough to investigate
any serious violations of international criminal law committed by the military
junta. The temporal jurisdiction of this hypothetical tribunal should probably run
from the date the junta lost the 1990 election 262 until whenever it eventually
collapses.
V. CONCLUSION

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this article. The
first is that the modem understanding of crimes against humanity can be
seamlessly applied to a government's failure to respond appropriately to a natural
disaster. Crimes against humanity started as an adjunct to the laws of war and for
much of its early history could only be committed in the context of an armed
conflict. 263 Doctrinally, it has been separated from the nexus with armed conflict
for some time, but the majority of crimes against humanity charges are still
brought in situations that are marked by armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the modem
understanding of crimes against humanity is clearly broad enough to be applied in
many situations that have no connection with armed conflicts, including the
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. It should be noted that no expansion of the doctrine
of crimes against humanity is being advocated in this article. All of the arguments
that have been made fall well within the existing jurisprudence of the modem
international courts.
This conclusion highlights the flexibility and utility of crimes against
humanity in comparison to war crimes or genocide. War crimes, by definition, are
261. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Myanmar Monks' Protest Contained by Junta's Forces,N.Y TIMES,
Sep. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/asia/28cnd-myanmar.html (noting that the
government had broken up protests led by tens of thousands of Myanmar's monks amid brutal attacks
by government forces on monasteries and protesting civilians); Amnesty Int'l, Crimes Against
Humanity in Eastern Myanmar, ASA/16/011/2008,
June
5, 2008,
available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/011/2008/en/d80827fl-3248-1 ldd-adb0a55f274fla5a/asal60112008eng.pdf (arguing that the government of Myanmar committed crimes
against humanity during the course of a military campaign against ethnic Karen civilians in Eastern
Myanmar);
Human
Rights First, Burma:
Crimes Against Humanity
in Burma,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/cah/burma/index.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) (accusing the
government of Myanmar of involvement in a number of crimes against humanity, including forced
displacements of ethnic minorities, forced labor, the recruitment of child soldiers, rape, enforced
disappearances and torture); Belgium Reopens Myanmar Humanity Crimes Probe Against Oil Giant
Total, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5g84fzhRA8Y6IvW-gmt7YmonfEBKg (noting that the oil company Total was accused of
crimes against humanity for using forced laborers provided by the military government during the
construction of a gas pipeline).
262. See supranote 247.
263. See generally Ford, supra note 152 (describing the evolution of crimes against humanity
during the 20th century).
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limited in their application to armed conflicts.264 As this author has noted
elsewhere, genocide is exceptionally difficult to prove because of the specific
intent requirement and genocide convictions are relatively rare.265 Crimes against
humanity, in contrast, can be applied to a much broader range of situations
including many that have not traditionally been prosecuted as violations of
international criminal law. It is the most versatile of the three major international
crimes and may well become the most frequently used. Genocide will continue to
be the "crime of crimes," but crimes against humanity will probably be used more
often. For example, crimes against humanity is the best way to invoke the
responsibility to protect during man-made humanitarian disasters that are not
marked by armed conflicts.
A second conclusion relates to the efficacy of the responsibility to protect. It
is tempting to view the responsibility to protect as a failure. It has been cited by
the Security Council, but Security Council paralysis has prevented any Chapter VII
enforcement actions to protect civilian populations in the years since the 2005
World Summit. If the primary purpose of the responsibility to protect is to save
lives, then it is hard to point to any group of lives that has been saved. Bernard
Kouchner was one of the few senior politicians calling for the application of the
responsibility to protect to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, and no country was
willing to intervene unilaterally once it became clear that the Security Council
would not act, even though the forces were in the right place at the right time to
make such intervention possible.
However, there are other ways to measure success.

Even though the

responsibility to protect was not applied, the argument was primarily about

whether it was appropriate to apply it given the facts in Myanmar. All of the
commentators accepted that the responsibility to protect does exist and does
require states to protect populations at risk. Thus, it appears that the responsibility
to protect has achieved significant acceptance in a few short years. The debate has
now shifted from whether the responsibility to protect exists to how to apply it in
specific cases.
In this respect, the United Nation's decision to make the application of the
responsibility to protect depend on the existence of violations of international
criminal law may prove a blessing in disguise when it comes to determining when
to apply the responsibility to protect. International criminal lawyers are wellequipped to offer reasoned advice on whether crimes against humanity, war
crimes, or genocide are occurring because there are well-established criteria for the
application of international criminal law in the jurisprudence of the international
courts. This should result in a much more systematic analysis of when the
responsibility to protect should be invoked. Of course, this will not guarantee that

264. It should be noted that crimes against humanity can also be used to capture much of the
mistreatment of civilian populations that has been the hallmark of internal armed conflicts.
265. See Robert Petit, Stuart Ford & Neha Jain, Exploring CriticalIssues in Religious Genocide:
Case Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat,40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 163, 212-14 (2008).
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the international community will act on the advice, but it does inject an element of
legal reasoning into what is otherwise an overtly political process.
The use of international criminal law as the triggering mechanism for the
responsibility to protect also has important implications for the ICC. In order to
invoke the responsibility to protect and use its coercive authority under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council must make either an
explicit or implicit finding that violations of international criminal law are
occurring. One consequence of this is that the Security Council then has, at the
minimum, a moral obligation to refer that situation to the ICC so that the crimes
can be investigated. Of course, there is no guarantee that the Security Council will
accompany every invocation of the responsibility to protect doctrine with a referral
to the ICCC. But this will not always prevent the ICC from acting. If the situation
that is the subject of the Security Council resolution is taking place on the territory
of an ICC member state, then the Security Council resolution will act as prima
facie evidence that the Prosecutor should initiate an investigation on his or her own
authority.
Finally, the use of international crimes to trigger the responsibility to protect
may actually save lives. While the majority of the debate has focused on the
questions of when the Security Council should authorize intervention, what form
the intervention should take, and whether unilateral intervention is legal, this is not
the most important aspect of the responsibility to protect. The most important
aspect is the duty to prevent the crimes from occurring in the first place. It is far
easier to protect the lives of civilians by preventing a crisis than it is by intervening
to try and stop the crisis.
The use of international criminal law to trigger the responsibility to protect
may help prevent crimes from occurring in the first place. One of the goals of
international criminal law is prevention through deterrence. If a head of state is
ever tried and found guilty of crimes against humanity arising out of the denial of
international aid to his or her own people, then other leaders in a similar situation
might think twice before refusing international aid. This would fulfill the primary
goal of the responsibility to protect - saving lives. Thus the pursuit of
accountability for violations of international criminal law also helps to promote the
underlying goals of the responsibility to protect.

